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FACEBOOK’S “OVERSIGHT BOARD:” MOVE FAST WITH STABLE
INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMILITY
Evelyn Douek *
Facebook’s proposed Oversight Board is one of the most
ambitious constitution-making projects of the modern era. With preexisting governance of tech platforms delegitimized in the ongoing
“techlash,” this represents a pivotal moment when new
constitutional forms can emerge that will shape the future of online
discourse. For all the potential of the Facebook Oversight Board
(FOB), there are many things it cannot be. It will not hear a
sufficient proportion of Facebook’s content moderation cases to be
a meaningful response to calls for greater due process in individual
decisions. Nor will it be able to become a font of globally accepted
speech norms for the worldwide platform. The true value that the
Board can bring to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem lies
between these two extremes of individual error correction and the
settlement of globally applicable speech rules. The institutional
offering of the Board should focus on two primary, but more modest,
functions. First, it can help highlight weaknesses in the policy
formation process at Facebook, removing blockages (such as blind
spots and inertia) in the “legislative process” leading to the
formulation of its Community Standards. Second, by providing an
independent forum for the discussion of disputed content
moderation decisions, the Board can be an important forum for the
public reasoning necessary for persons in a pluralistic community
to come to accept the rules that govern them, even if they disagree
with the substance of those rules. Understanding the institutional
role of the Board in these terms provides useful insights into the
institutional design that will best help it achieve these goals.
Doctoral candidate, Harvard Law School. B. Com./LL.B. UNSW (Hons. I).
Thanks are owed to Martha Minow, Jack Goldsmith, Cass Sunstein, Noah
Feldman, Thomas Kadri, Elettra Bietti, Rafe Andrews and the editors of N.C.
JOLT. I can’t fob my errors off onto anyone else though; they remain my own.
*
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Mark Zuckerberg, the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of
Facebook, is engaged in one of the most ambitious constitutional
projects of the modern era. On November 15, 2018, he announced
in a blog post that by the end of 2019, Facebook will “create a new
way for people to appeal content decisions to an independent body,
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whose decisions would be transparent and binding.” 1 Facebook has
since released a “Draft Charter,” describing the “Oversight Board”
as “a body of independent experts who will review Facebook’s most
challenging content decisions – focusing on important and disputed
cases.” 2 In an earlier interview, when he first floated the idea,
Zuckerberg analogized the proposed body to a “Supreme Court.” 3
Thus, it seems that Zuckerberg is intending to introduce a check and
balance into the governance of his sovereign domain of
“Facebookistan.” 4
This innovation comes amidst ongoing constitutional upheaval
for the Internet. The “techlash” 5 of the past few years, started by
revelations of fake news and disinformation in the 2016 U.S.
election 6 but sweeping broadly through the tech sector since then, 7
Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement,
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/markzuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/
10156443129621634/ [https://perma.cc/C7P3-DLYT].
2
DRAFT CHARTER: AN OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS,
FACEBOOK (Jan. 28, 2019) [hereinafter DRAFT CHARTER]. This paper reflects
publicly-available details as of September 10, 2019.
3
Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s hardest year, and what comes
next, VOX (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/markzuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge
[https://perma.cc/7A2Z-HT6D].
4
See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 149 (2012); Anupam Chander,
Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807 (2012).
5
Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e
[https://perma.cc/8RJH-CV2B]; Eve Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon,
Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazonfacebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do
[https://perma.cc/BBH6-LNTY];
DICTIONARIES,
Word
of
the
Year
2018:
shortlist,
OXFORD
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/shortlist-2018
[https://perma.cc/G9D4-GTBV].
6
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS:” THE
ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (Jan. 6, 2017).
7
Facebook has been under fire for everything from failing to prevent political
operatives from having access to private data, to having a “determining role” in
the ongoing genocide in Myanmar, to “poisoning” or “breaking” democracy.
1

4
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has disrupted the status quo. Comparative scholarship shows that
“[n]ew constitutional forms emerge only under extraordinary
historical conditions, moments when pre-existing political,
economic, and social structures have been weakened [or]
delegitimized.” 8 With prior content moderation practices receiving
unprecedented public scrutiny and suffering a crisis of legitimacy,
this moment represents such conditions for online platforms. The
changes that emerge now will have significant ramifications for the
future of online discourse, and because these online platforms
mediate so much of modern life, sometimes called the “modern
public square,” 9 the effects will be far reaching.
Facebook is the most globally dominant social media company,
with 2.32 billion monthly active users in countries around the world
using the service in over 100 different languages. 10 The public
discourse that occurs on Facebook is central to political and cultural
life in and between countries around the world. 11 As tech companies
everywhere are looking for solutions to the problems of content
moderation, Facebook’s governance innovation could provide a
model—or cautionary tale—for others. This is therefore a pivotal
moment in the history of online speech governance.
Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know
as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/5WGE-D9RK]; REUTERS, Myanmar: UN Blames Facebook for
Spreading Hatred of Rohingya, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2018),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/13/myanmar-un-blamesfacebook-for-spreading-hatred-of-rohingya
[https://perma.cc/YYH9-ZJM7];
Zeynep Tufekci, It’s the (Democracy-Poisoning) Golden Age of Free Speech,
WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-techturmoil-new-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/LJB3-PPLW]; Evan Osnos, Can Mark
Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerbergfix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/YUR5-BNHN].
8
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE 38 (2000).
9
Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___,___ 8 (2017).
10
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM,
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/BL5F-NR8S] (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
11
ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF
NETWORKED PROTEST 6 (2017).
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For all the potential of the Facebook Oversight Board
(hereinafter, FOB), there are many things it cannot be. Politicians, 12
academics, 13 civil society, 14 and users 15 have long been calling for
greater transparency and due process in Facebook’s application of
its Community Standards and other content moderation decisions. 16
However, the FOB cannot be a meaningful answer to these calls. In
other contexts, an appeal or some form of “judicial review” of a
decision can be a form of due process: such mechanisms give
complainants an opportunity to voice their grievance, have a
hearing, and receive some form of explanation for their treatment. 17
Appeals processes can also be a way of ensuring the effective
functioning of a bureaucratic system and rule enforcement by
creating a mechanism for error correction. But the sheer volume of
content moderation decisions Facebook makes every day 18 means
that the FOB cannot be expected to offer this kind of procedural
recourse or error correction in anything but the smallest fraction of

12
Evelyn Douek, Transatlantic Techlash Continues as U.K. and U.S.
Lawmakers Release Proposals for Regulation, LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/transatlantic-techlash-continues-uk-and-uslawmakers-release-proposals-regulation [https://perma.cc/5CYR-LFJX].
13
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018);
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance and Private Power in the
Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 66 (2019); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist
Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1035 (2018).
14
An Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES (Nov. 13,
2018), https://santaclaraprinciples.org/images/scp-og.png [https://perma.cc/
EEQ5-ETFM]; David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/38/35 (June 4, 2018).
15
See, e.g., Civil society organizations, on behalf of 143,000 people, Letter to
Mark Zuckerberg (Aug. 22, 2016) https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.sumofus.org/
images/FinalLetter-MarkZuckerberg_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJS-ST5U].
16
See TIMOTHY GARTON ASH ET AL., GLASNOST! NINE WAYS FACEBOOK
CAN MAKE ITSELF A BETTER FORUM FOR FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 18–20
(2019).
17
Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV.
991, 997 (2006).
18
See discussion infra at Part II(A).
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these cases. 19 This is compounded in Facebook’s case by the
difficulty of ensuring the FOB’s decisions are effectively
communicated and absorbed by the globally distributed and timestarved workforce of content moderators that make the first instance
content moderation decisions. 20
Tellingly, due process or individual error correction are not the
reasons Facebook says it is establishing the FOB. “Due process” is
not mentioned in Zuckerberg’s blog post announcing the blueprint
for the body or in the Draft Charter released a few months later. 21 As
for error correction, Zuckerberg says that artificial intelligence and
more content moderators will help reduce mistakes but “we will
never be perfect.” 22 Facebook seems to conceive of the FOB as
something different, and grander. In describing the function of the
body, the Draft Charter explains that because decisions over what
should and should not be allowed on Facebook are “too
consequential for Facebook to make alone” 23 the FOB will review
the “most challenging content decisions” to provide oversight and
make Facebook more accountable. 24 It will be charged with
reviewing enforcement of Facebook’s Community Standards—
which “apply around the world to all types of content” 25—in
Issie Lapowsky, Real Facebook Oversight Requires More Than a 40-Expert
Board, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-oversightboard-draft-charter/ [https://perma.cc/ZYU9-F6JB].
20
See, e.g., Sarah T. Roberts, Social Media’s Silent Filter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/commercialcontent-moderation/518796/ [https://perma.cc/3EEG-T28K] (“In a matter of
seconds, following pre-determined company policy, CCM workers make
decisions about the appropriateness of images, video, or postings that appear on a
given site . . . Increasingly, CCM work is done globally, . . . CCM workers are
almost always contractors, in many cases limited in term due to their high rate of
burnout.”).
21
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
22
Id.
23
Nick Clegg, Charting a Course for an Oversight Board for Content
Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 28, 2019) https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2019/01/oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/9A4W-XAM2].
24
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 1.
25
Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/5ZXL-VTF8] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019).
19
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accordance with a set of indisputably worthy and sweeping values
“like voice, safety, equity, dignity, equality and privacy.” 26
However, if the vision of the FOB is to be a magisterial font of
global speech norms for the global platform, this too is mistaken.
The FOB will never be the ultimate arbiter of free speech norms
around the world whose pronouncements are accepted as legitimate
in the way a court of final appeal might in a domestic legal system.
It has neither the legitimacy nor authority necessary to fulfil this
role.
The true value that the FOB can bring to Facebook’s content
moderation ecosystem lies between these two extremes of individual
error correction and the settlement of globally applicable speech
rules. The institutional offering of the FOB should focus on two
primary, but more modest, functions. First, it can help highlight
weaknesses in the policy formation process at Facebook, removing
blockages (such as blind spots and inertia) in the “legislative
process” leading to the formulation of its Community Standards. 27
Second, by providing an independent forum for the discussion of
disputed content moderation decisions, the FOB can be an important
forum for the process of public reasoning necessary for persons in a
pluralistic community to come to accept the rules that govern them,
even if they disagree with the substance of those rules. 28
Understanding the institutional role of the FOB in these terms
provides useful insights into the institutional design that will best
help it achieve these goals.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II looks at the context for
the introduction of the FOB into Facebook’s content moderation
ecosystem. Content moderation—determining what should and
shouldn’t be allowed on Facebook’s platform—is both an
impossible and indispensable part of Facebook’s business. This
paradox sheds light on why Facebook would voluntarily subject
itself to the constraints of an independent appeal body. Key amongst
the reasons for establishing the FOB is the desire to find a way of
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3.
Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 2193 (2017).
28
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212 (2005).
26
27
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legitimizing the power that Facebook exercises over its users and
the public sphere. It is only in understanding this context that we can
begin to ask what would make the FOB’s institutional design
effective.
Part III sketches the current vision of the FOB based on early
documents describing its institutional design. While not final, these
documents reveal key design decisions, such as the intended
membership of the FOB, its power to review Facebook decisions,
and the scope of its jurisdiction.
Part IV turns to the limitations on the FOB and the ways in which
it differs from any prior institution that make the legitimizing goal
especially difficult for the FOB. Not only will it be difficult for
Facebook to make credible its commitment to be bound by the FOB
in cases where its decisions are damaging to the company’s business
interests, but the FOB also does not have a reservoir of legitimacy
to draw on when making deeply contested decisions. The FOB will
need to establish its legitimacy over time, and its task will be all the
more challenging in these circumstances.
Part V turns to the ways in which Facebook can maximize the
value the FOB can bring to its content moderation ecosystem in light
of these inherent limitations. The value of a judicial-style check does
not require the FOB to have ultimate say in all decisions; indeed, a
“weak-form” judicial review model may be more appropriate in the
dynamic environment of online speech. Nor does the FOB need to
issue universally-accepted decisions; indeed, it will not be able to.
But it is the process of public reasoning itself which is the raison
d’être of the FOB and should be the focus of the body’s design.
The FOB is an experiment in governance that responds to an
unprecedented amount of control by a private platform over the
global public sphere. It will not and should not be a copy of any
institution from a radically different context. This does not mean
that there is not much that can be learned from previous experience
before the beta version of this updated form of platform governance
is released. This paper explores those lessons.
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II.
THE FOB’S PURPOSE
On its face, Zuckerberg and Facebook’s decision to set up the
FOB might seem counterintuitive. Content moderation—platforms’
practice of designing and enforcing rules for what they allow to be
posted on their services—is, as Gillespie says, the commodity that
platforms offer users. 29 The decision to move some of the power
over this core part of Facebook’s business into independent hands
may seem puzzling. Public pressure over Facebook’s decisions in
recent years is not enough to explain the move. Zuckerberg is
insulated from the need to respond to public pressure by his near
absolute control of the company as founder, chief executive,
chairman of the Board, and majority shareowner. 30 But as
Facebook’s Head of Policy Management has written: “[s]imply put,
there are business reasons that a big social media company must pay
attention to what the world thinks of its speech rules.” 31 The goals
of the FOB need to be understood in the context of how it might
serve these business imperatives.
There is a much more familiar context in which holders of
expansive unilateral power nevertheless employ a court system as a
check and balance: rulers in authoritarian regimes. Scholars have
previously drawn the comparison of Facebook as an autocracy 32 due
TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS,
CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL
MEDIA 5 (2018).
30
Julia Carrie Wong, Zuckerberg’s Control of Facebook is near Absolute –
Who Will Hold Him Accountable?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2018),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/21/zuckerbergs-control-offacebook-is-near-absolute-who-will-hold-him-accountable
[https://perma.cc/2ZBH-KPVY].
31
Monika Bickert, Defining the Boundaries of Free Speech on Social Media,
in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 254, 265 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2018).
32
David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, KNIGHT
FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/
content/authoritarian-constitutionalism-facebookland
[https://perma.cc/PP95Z3RD] (drawing on Mark Tushnet’s characterization of absolutist
constitutionalism as a system as one where “a single decisionmaker motivated by
an interest in the nation’s well-being consults widely and protects civil liberties
generally, but in the end, decides on a course of action in the decisionmaker’s sole
discretion, unchecked by any other institutions.”); Balkin, supra note 13, at 2024;
29
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to Zuckerberg’s unchecked power over what Zuckerberg calls the
Facebook “community.” 33 The introduction of the FOB therefore
raises the same question that comparative constitutional literature
has grappled with: why do dictators allow courts any degree of
judicial independence which might interfere with their power? 34 To
be clear, the use of the term “authoritarian” is descriptive and
without normative judgment. Facebook is a company, not a nation
state. 35 Authoritarianism in the sense of an executive having
decision-making capacity unbounded by formal internal checks is
not unusual in this context. But the analogy is helpful in
understanding why Facebook might introduce an “independent”
check and balance into its governance. 36
After briefly sketching the impossible challenge of content
moderation that the FOB is intended to help solve, this section draws
on the rich literature on courts in authoritarian regimes to examine
the reasons the FOB, and the renunciation of power that it
represents, might appeal to Facebook as a solution.
A. Facebook’s Approach to the Impossible Task of Content
Moderation
Consistent and coherent content moderation on the scale of a
platform like Facebook is essentially an impossible challenge.
Henry Farrell et al., Mark Zuckerberg Runs a Nation-State, and He’s the King,
VOX (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/9/17214752/
zuckerberg-facebook-power-regulation-data-privacy-control-political-theorydata-breach-king [https://perma.cc/W2Z3-EQED]; MACKINNON, supra note 4;
Chander, supra note 4.
33
Justin Hendrix, Is Facebook a Community? Digital Experts Weigh In, JUST
SECURITY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54850/facebookcommunity-digital-experts-weigh/ [https://perma.cc/2UNT-JQY5].
34
See generally MEHDI SHADMEHR ET AL., JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUTOCRACIES (2019); RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds.,
2008).
35
ANDREW KEANE WOODS, TECH FIRMS ARE NOT SOVEREIGNS (2018).
36
See, e.g., Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 281 (2014) (discussing the rich literature of the
dynamics of courts in authoritarian regimes that helps explain how such
institutions can further an autocrat’s aims).
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Facebook has over 2 billion monthly active users, 37 and over 2.5
billion pieces of content are shared on its platform every day. 38 This
content is moderated to align with Facebook’s public rules, called
“Community Standards,” 39 and its internal guidelines. 40 In the first
quarter of 2019 alone, Facebook “took action” on nearly 1.873
billion pieces of content for being in breach of these rules. 41
Excluding the 1.8 billion pieces of content Facebook marked as
spam, this means Facebook classified nearly 73 million pieces of
content as falling within the other categories in its Community
Standards: adult nudity and sexual activity, bullying and
harassment, child nudity and sexual exploitation of children, hate
speech, regulated goods, global terrorist propaganda, and violence
and graphic content. 42 Because not every piece of content flagged
for review is actually found to violate Facebook’s rules, these
numbers represent only a subset of flagged items that Facebook
evaluates. 43 Facebook receives more than a million reports of
violations of its content standards per day. 44 As well as reviewing
these reports, Facebook also re-reviews decisions that are appealed
by users. In the first quarter of 2019, Facebook received nearly 25
million requests for appeal—around 275,000 requests per day. 45
Clearly, this does not give the 30,000 people Facebook currently
employs to enforce its Community Standards much time to consider
each decision. 46

FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, supra note 10.
GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 114.
39
Community Standards, supra note 25.
40
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1638–9 (2018).
41
Community Standards, supra note 25.
42
Id.
43
See GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 74.
44
Bickert, supra note 31, at 256.
45
Community Standards, supra note 25 (calculations on file with the author).
46
Zuckerberg, supra note 1. For insight into the tough working conditions of
front line content moderators, see SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN:
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019).
37
38
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Simply employing more people would not solve Facebook’s
moderation woes (although it could certainly help). 47 While a larger
workforce might be able to more carefully consider each decision
(for example, by looking at more contextual information that might
shed light on the intended meaning of a particular post), this might
come at the cost of greater consistency between decisions. 48
Consistency is an important indicator of fairness. Because of this,
and because of the sheer number of content moderation decisions
Facebook has to make, the company has developed an “industrial”
approach to content moderation. 49 The goal is to create a “decision
factory,” where application of Community Standards is reduced to
bright-line rules, whose application is routinized and efficient. 50
This attempted clean-cut approach has attracted controversy, such
as over the strict use of “protected categories” in Facebook’s hate
speech policy leading to posts attacking “white men” being found to
contravene the Standards but not those targeting “black children.” 51
Another tool Facebook uses to make content moderation at scale
manageable is artificial intelligence (AI). 52 In his Blueprint,
Zuckerberg calls AI “the single most important improvement in
enforcing our policies,” because it can quickly and proactively
identify harmful content. 53 This further reflects Facebook’s
Ellen Silver, Hard Questions: Who Reviews Objectionable Content on
Facebook — And Is the Company Doing Enough to Support Them?, FACEBOOK
(July 26, 2018) https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/hard-questions-contentreviewers/ [https://perma.cc/2WGP-VPHQ] (explaining that Facebook itself has
recognized this, doubling its content moderation staff in 2018).
48
ROBYN CAPLAN, DATA & SOCIETY, CONTENT OR CONTEXT MODERATION? 6,
13 (2018).
49
GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 77.
50
Caplan, supra note 48, at 24.
51
Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules
Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June
28, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorshipinternal-documents-algorithms [https://perma.cc/P4SU-Z7YK].
52
Drew Harwell, AI Will Solve Facebook’s Most Vexing Problems, Mark
Zuckerberg Says. Just Don’t Ask When or How., WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/ai-will-solvefacebooks-most-vexing-problems-mark-zuckerberg-says-just-dont-ask-when-orhow/ [https://perma.cc/C3X6-2QFP].
53
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
47
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mechanistic approach to content moderation. For every category
except bullying and harassment, and hate speech, Facebook found
over 95% of the content it took down as violating its Community
Standards before it was reported by a user, in large part because of
its AI. But the exception of bullying and harassment, and hate
speech is telling: these two categories of content are harder for
Facebook to proactively identify because they are so highly contextdependent. As Facebook notes, bullying and harrassment reports
“tend to be personal and context-specific, so in many instances we
need a person to report this behavior to us before we can identify or
remove it. This results in a lower proactive detection rate than other
types of violations.” 54 Hate speech is notoriously difficult to detect
through automated processes, because it depends so much on
linguistic nuance, intention, and local norms. 55 Context is allimportant at these “complex frontiers of political speech, dangerous
speech, and hate speech.” 56 So while AI is a necessary part of content
moderation at scale, it is not sufficient.
Even if it was technologically possible to train AI to appreciate
the infinite spectrum of human nuance, there are at least two more
reasons why AI cannot be a complete answer to the content
moderation problem.
First, AI does not give a person who has a decision made against
them the substance or feeling of due process or of being heard. 57 AI
Guy Rosen, How Are We Doing at Enforcing Our Community Standards?,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 15, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/
11/enforcing-our-community-standards-2/ [https://perma.cc/72PF-T6FG].
55
Evelyn Douek, Zuckerberg’s New Hate Speech Plan: Out With the Court and
In With the Code, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
zuckerbergs-new-hate-speech-plan-out-court-and-code [https://perma.cc/4HDTPASA] (noting Zuckerberg acknowledges the difficulty of using AI to detect hate
speech in Congressional testimony, and discussing why it is difficult); Zuckerberg
also acknowledged as much in his Blueprint. Zuckerberg, supra note 1 (“As you
get into hate speech and bullying, linguistic nuances get even harder . . . the state
of the art in AI is still not sufficient to handle these challenges on its own. So we
use computers for what they’re good at -- making basic judgements on large
amounts of content quickly -- and we rely on people for making more complex
and nuanced judgements that require deeper expertise.”).
56
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 11.
57
See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1249 (2007).
54
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also does not give public reasoning for its decisions, which, as
argued below, 58 is an essential component of a legitimate content
moderation system.
Second, and even more fundamentally, AI cannot be a full
answer to the difficulties of content moderation because AI cannot
determine the anterior question of the values that should be encoded
into the detection algorithms. Before asking AI to identify and
remove hate speech from the platform, for example, it has to be told
what to look for. But what constitutes impermissible hate speech is
an essentially contested concept that varies around the world. 59 As
one Facebook representative writes, “[t]here is no universally
accepted answer for when something crosses the line. Although a
number of countries have laws against hate speech, their definitions
of it vary significantly.” 60 A well-known example is Holocaust
denial. As a fairly concrete category of speech, less context
dependent than many others, this might be a prime example of
speech that AI might be able to more easily identify. But while
Holocaust denial is illegal in several countries, 61 it is famously not
in the United States where the decision that Nazis should be allowed
to march in front of Holocaust survivors is seen as one of the “truly
great victories” in American legal history. 62 AI itself cannot choose
between these two opposing conceptions of free speech: it has to be
told whether to find and remove Holocaust denial by a human.
Another example is Facebook’s exception to its Community
See Part V(B).
See, e.g., Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY
123 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2010); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2006); Sarah H. Cleveland, Hate Speech
at Home and Abroad, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 210 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2018).
60
Richard Allan, Hard Questions: Who Should Decide What Is Hate Speech in
an Online Global Community?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 27, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/hard-questions-hate-speech/
[https://perma.cc/LB5P-8QR9].
61
MICHAEL BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW: A QUEST FOR
JUSTICE IN A POST-HOLOCAUST WORLD 183–209 (2017).
62
Geoffrey R. Stone, Remembering the Nazis in Skokie, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 20, 2009), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/rememberingthe-nazis-in_b_188739.html. [perma.cc/H22C-3NLK].
58
59
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Standards for content it deems to be “newsworthy.” 63 These cases
require a balancing of the harm caused by allowing speech that
breaches Facebook’s rules to remain on the platform against the
public interest in being informed about the particular matter. Such
balancing cannot be done in the abstract or ex ante and encoded into
an algorithm, but requires case-by-case consideration.
Enter Facebook’s “Oversight Board,” which could temper the
industrial application of content moderation rules at scale. The FOB
can give a user an opportunity to be heard, and will then consider all
the relevant context and competing values at stake in the case at
hand. But more importantly, the FOB will offer an explanation for
why content is or is not allowed on Facebook’s platform.
B. The Benefits of Voluntary Restraints
The question remains, however, why outsource this role to an
independent body? Greater transparency and reason-giving could be
provided by Facebook employees and policy-makers within the
current content moderation ecosystem. And despite growing calls, 64
Zuckerberg is showing no signs of wanting to relinquish any of his
enormously powerful roles at his company. 65 His enjoyment of this
power is a matter of legend. 66
KATE KLONICK, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. EMERGING THREATS SERIES,
FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN (2018).
64
Margaret Sullivan, Embattled and In Over His Head, Mark Zuckerberg
Should—At Least—Step Down As Facebook Chairman, WASH. POST (Nov. 19,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/embattled-and-in-overhis-head-mark-zuckerberg-should--at-least--step-down-as-facebookchairman/2018/11/19/de00c2d8-ebfa-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.
[perma.cc/VA7F-CSQ8].
65
Kara Swisher, Full Transcript: Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg on Recode
Decode, RECODE (July 18, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/7/18/17575158/
mark-zuckerberg-facebook-interview-full-transcript-kara-swisher
[perma.cc/KR44-C4S3] (confirming he has no intention of firing himself);
Richard Lawler, Zuckerberg Says Stepping Down at Facebook is “Not the Plan,”
ENGADGET, (Nov. 20, 2018) https://www.engadget.com/2018/11/20/zuckerbergsays-stepping-down-at-facebook-is-not-the-plan/
[perma.cc/2YB3-J8VX]
(confirming he has no intention of stepping down as Chairman of the board).
66
Zuckerberg famously had business cards that declared “I’m CEO, Bitch:”
MG Siegler, Card Designer: The Inspiration For Zuckerberg’s “I’m CEO,
Bitch”? Steve Jobs., TECHCRUNCH (2010), http://social.techcrunch.com/2011/
63
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Nevertheless, the establishment of the FOB does constitute a
renunciation of a degree of Facebook’s power. The FOB will have
the power to reverse Facebook’s decisions, 67 constraining the
otherwise plenary discretion that Facebook currently has over what
appears on its platform. 68 Its establishment will recreate a system of
separation of powers, where an independent judicial-style body will
oversee the other branches of Facebook’s content moderation: the
legislative branch that writes Facebook’s content moderation rules,
and executive actors who implement these rules (with the help of
AI). This is an unprecedented governance structure for a private
company. But it is, of course, the dominant form of governance in
nation states.
The matter should not be overstated—Zuckerberg is not
recreating liberal democratic governance. He is not subjecting
himself or his role to democratic accountability. But the FOB
initiative is in keeping with Zuckerberg’s long-standing
pronouncements that Facebook is “more like a government than a
traditional company.” 69 By initially referring to the FOB as a
“Supreme Court” and calling its rules of operation a “Charter,” for
example, Zuckerberg is implicitly distinguishing the FOB from
other, more well-known forms of online dispute resolution (ODR)
such as eBay’s Resolution Center. 70 The message is that this is not
ordinary commercial customer relations management; this is
something grander. And the distinction is accurate. While most
ODR systems are directed at resolving disputes between two private

06/25/im-ceo-bitch/ [perma.cc/3FCF-CSX4].
67
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 1.
68
Klonick, supra note 40, at 1617 (“These platforms are both the architecture
for publishing new speech and the architects of the institutional design that
governs it. Because of the wide immunity granted by § 230, these architects are
free to choose which values they want to protect — or to protect no values at all.”).
69
DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2010) (quoting Zuckerberg as
saying, “[i]n a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional
company. We have this large community of people, and more than other
technology companies we’re really setting policies.”).
70
ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY
AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES 34 (2017).
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parties (such as a buyer and seller), 71 the FOB will be resolving
disputes more analogous to public law. The disputes it will hear will
revolve around the exercise of power by the “government” of
Facebook. 72 In making decisions about the rules in what has become
a key channel of public discourse, the FOB’s decisions will also
need to take into account a broader conception of the “public
interest,” rather than the mere resolution of the immediate dispute
before it. So, while many of these other ODR systems are
increasingly looking to automate processes and displace human
dispute handlers, 73 the FOB looks to reintroduce and elevate the
human component, recalling more conventional offline dispute
resolution bodies.
There are four apparent reasons why this governance structure
may appeal to Facebook for solving the content moderation
dilemmas outlined above: (1) bestowing content-moderation
decisions with an aura of legitimacy, aiding user-relations;
(2) staving off or guiding more extensive governmental regulation;
(3) outsourcing controversial decisions away from the company; and
(4) facilitating better enforcement of existing standards. These
closely track the reasons authoritarian regimes often retain court
systems at least somewhat independent from the regime. 74
Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 554
(2016); see also Josh Dzieza, Dirty dealing in the $175 billion Amazon
Marketplace, VERGE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/
19/18140799/amazon-marketplace-scams-seller-court-appeal-reinstatement
[perma.cc/6BFB-MLPT].
72
Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (Public law is
defined as “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private
individuals and the government, and with the structure and operation of the
government itself”).
73
KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 70, at 38.
74
Moustafa and Ginsburg suggest five functions for courts in an authoritarian
state: “to (1) establish social control and sideline political opponents, (2) bolster
a regime’s claim to ‘legal’ legitimacy, (3) strengthen administrative compliance
within the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems
among competing factions within the regime, (4) facilitate trade and investment,
and (5) implement controversial policies so as to allow political distance from
core elements of the regime.” Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction, in
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 4 (Tamir
Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008).
71
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1.

Bestowing Legitimacy and Reassuring Users
Legitimacy is central to the FOB experiment. The topic of
legitimacy is discussed at length below, 75 but two points are worth
noting here. First, “legitimacy” can mean many things and is hard to
define. 76 Throughout this paper, references to “legitimacy” are
references to what Fallon calls “sociological legitimacy”—that is,
the prevailing public attitude towards Facebook’s content
moderation. 77 Importantly, legitimacy does not mean correctness;
instead, “in circumstances of relatively widespread reasonable
disagreement, . . . legitimacy connote[s] respect-worthiness.” 78
Therefore, the mission to legitimate Facebook’s content moderation
ecosystem aims to create a situation where its decisions are
generally considered somewhat worthy of respect, even if there are
those that still disagree with the substance of those decisions. The
second point worth noting is that this definition of legitimacy
highlights the very low baseline from which Facebook is operating.
In the past few years, Facebook’s decisions have increasingly come
to be viewed as inconsistent and arbitrary, and therefore
illegitimate. 79 A recent Pew survey found that only 31% of U.S.
adults have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in social media
companies to determine what offensive content should be removed
from their platforms. 80 For the FOB to be successful in conferring
legitimacy to Facebook’s content moderation, it does not need to
create a situation where content moderation comes to be viewed as
See infra Part IV.
RICHARD H. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 6
(2018).
77
Id. at 21 (that is, this paper is not directly concerned with the legal or moral
legitimacy of Facebook’s decisions, although these will of course affect
sociological legitimacy).
78
Id. at 8.
79
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 18; Kaye, supra note 14; Nicolas Suzor et al.,
Evaluating the Legitimacy of Platform Governance: A Review of Research and a
Shared Research Agenda, 80 INT’L COMM. GAZ. 385 (2018).
80
John LaLoggia, U.S. public has little confidence in social media companies
RESEARCH
CENTER,
to
determine
offensive
content,
PEW
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/11/u-s-public-has-littleconfidence-in-social-media-companies-to-determine-offensive-content/
[https://perma.cc/TB27-DH3T].
75
76
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perfectly legitimate. In some ways, the FOB’s job is much simpler
than that: it only needs to create improvements over the current state
of widespread perceptions of illegitimacy.
Independent, court-like institutions are one tool for mitigating
the extent to which an otherwise unconstrained ruler’s decisions are
viewed as wholly illegitimate. As Dixon and Landau write, “[w]hen
exercising powers of judicial review, most courts are . . . afforded a
degree of presumptive legitimacy.” 81 Authoritarian regimes use
courts in this way: because they lack democratic procedural
legitimacy in the exercise of power, such regimes often use courts
to give a patina of more substantive legitimacy to their rule. 82 Why
should such regimes care about legitimacy in the first place? For
authoritarian regimes, legitimacy is important because it can reduce
the costs and necessity of resorting to force to maintain power. 83 For
Facebook, the calculation is somewhat different but not entirely so.
Because “code is law,” 84 Facebook’s enforcement of its rules does
not rely on force in the same way. 85 However, such enforcement will
have other costs if stakeholders oppose Facebook’s rulings.
Facebook needs the approval of governments, users, advertisers, and
the media in establishing its speech norms because these
stakeholders can exert commercial pressure on the company—these
are the “business reasons” that Facebook must pay attention to
external reactions to how it polices its platform. 86
Indeed, because “exit” (i.e. leaving the platform) is easier than
physical exit from a state, the costs of illegitimate decisions may be
even greater. While network effects make it more unlikely that
Facebook will become the next Myspace, a social media graveyard
of abandoned profiles, 87 the last few years of scandals no doubt make
David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against
Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __, 23 (forthcoming 2020).
82
Moustafa, supra note 36, at 286.
83
Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 5.
84
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE V2.0 (Version 2.0 ed. 2006).
85
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT
101–26 (2008).
86
Bickert, supra note 31, at 265.
87
See John Herrman, What Happens When Facebook Goes the Way of
Myspace?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/
81
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Facebook afraid to be complacent. As a Facebook-commissioned
report by a group of independent academics explained:
Facebook has considerable capacity to manage its content regulation
process in a top down manner which pays minimal attention to users’
views. However, the very existence of the [Community Standards
Enforcement Report] highlights the recognition that public views about
Facebook and its attitude about the public matter. They matter for the
individual user both because disgruntled users find ways to circumvent
rules, for example opening multiple accounts. In addition, unhappy
customers are less likely to use the site and more likely to seek
alternatives to it. 88

Put simply, authoritarians and companies value legitimacy
because it can reduce the costs of decisions with which people
disagree. 89
Perceived legitimacy not only improves Facebook’s relationship
with its users, but also with its commercial partners such as
advertisers. Such partners may be dissuaded from dealing with
Facebook if it becomes too unpredictable or entails high reputational
costs. Again, this may seem a distant threat given Facebook’s
practical duopoly over online advertising, but it no doubt still factors
into Facebook’s decisions. The FOB’s role in mitigating this threat
again resembles the way authoritarian regimes use courts to respond
to foreign investor fears over an unpredictable local business
environment. 90 As Moustafa observes, “[i]n the age of global
competition for capital, it is difficult to find any government that is
not engaged in some program of judicial reform designed to make
legal institutions more effective, efficient, and predictable for the

\magazine/what-happens-when-facebook-goes-the-way-of-myspace.html
[https://perma.cc/EXK3-TE77].
88
BEN BRADFORD ET AL., THE JUSTICE COLLABORATORY OF YALE LAW
SCHOOL, REPORT OF THE FACEBOOK DATA TRANSPARENCY ADVISORY GROUP 39
(Apr. 2019).
89
As Sarah T. Roberts notes, “content moderation is fundamentally a matter of
brand protection for the firm.” Sarah T. Roberts, Digital Detritus: “Error” and
the Logic of Opacity in Social Media Content Moderation, FIRST MONDAY (Mar.
5,
2018),
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/8283/6649
[https://perma.cc/9UQG-PP3U].
90
Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816, 820 (2012).
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purpose of attracting global capital.” 91 For example, Egypt bolstered
its court processes in the late-1950s and 1960s to stem the severe
capital flight it was experiencing as investors became wary of the
consolidation of unchecked power in the Nasser regime. 92 For both
users and commercial partners, then, an independent body
overseeing content moderation can reassure these stakeholders,
raising the value of the Facebook “product” of content moderation
by making it appear more stable and less subject to Facebook’s
whims. 93
Courts are also a relatively low-cost way of achieving these
legitimacy gains. For many authoritarian regimes, “[g]ranting
access to the courts was a concrete way to relieve political pressure
without opening the political system.” 94 That is, a court-like check
is a far more limited surrender of power, defined in scope, than
wholesale reform of the policy-making institutions. Facebook may
think that by surrendering some power over content moderation
decisions to the FOB, it is bolstering its claim to run the community
for the benefit of its users and thereby weakening calls for more
extensive reforms to decision-making at the company.
2.

Staving Off or Guiding Regulation
Facebook may view the establishment of the FOB as a way of
forestalling more extensive governmental regulation or at least as an
opportunity to shape the form that such regulation may take. As tech
platforms’ power and the related number of controversies grow,
there is a growing sense that new laws are “inevitable.” 95 Even
Moustafa, supra note 36, at 285.
Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS
IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 132, 133–36 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg
eds., 2008); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constiutionalism, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 391, 423 (2015).
93
Georg Vanberg, Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 99, 107 (Gregory A. Caldeira et
al. eds., 2008).
94
Moustafa, supra note 36, at 287.
95
Matt O’Brien & Mary Clare Jalonick, Is Facebook Regulation “Inevitable”?
Not So Fast, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2018-04-11/is-facebookregulation-inevitable-not-so-fast [https://perma.cc/4NCM-GLHM].
91
92
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Zuckerberg himself is now calling for global regulation of “harmful
content.” 96 In the absence of global regulation, an ad hoc patchwork
of local regulations could be costlier for companies by requiring
them to comply with multiple different sets of rules. Research shows
that even relatively modest voluntary efforts by private firms to
restrain their own behavior can stave off much more stringent public
regulations. 97 A good example of this is ad transparency on social
media platforms. Facebook, Google, and Twitter have all recently
unveiled voluntary ad transparency measures. 98 Meanwhile, the
proposed Honest Ads Act, which would compel these sorts of
disclosures, has made little progress in Congress, 99 despite extensive
reporting about weaknesses in Facebook’s ad transparency tools. 100
Another example is tech platforms entering into voluntary Code of
Mark Zuckerberg, Four Ideas to Regulate the Internet, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Mar. 30, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/four-ideasregulate-internet/ [https://perma.cc/LSF5-PPS5].
97
Neil Malhotra et al., Does Private Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?,
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2018).
98
Issie Lapowsky & Louise Matsakis, You Can Now See All the Ads Facebook
Is Running Globally, WIRED (June 28, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/
facebook-aims-more-transparency-view-ads-feature/
[https://perma.cc/6HGF5VFC].
99
Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).
100
Matthew Rosenberg, Ad Tool Facebook Built to Fight Disinformation
Doesn’t Work as Advertised, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/technology/facebook-ad-library.html
[https://perma.cc/C5NB-8N2R]; Ariana Tobin & Jeremy B. Merrill, Facebook’s
Screening for Political Ads Nabs News Sites Instead of Politicians, PROPUBLICA
(June 15, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-new-screeningsystem-flags-the-wrong-ads-as-political [https://perma.cc/7DZ7-NJES]; April
Glaser, It’s Impossible to Tell if Russians Are Pushing Political Propaganda on
Facebook, SLATE MAGAZINE (July 5, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/
07/facebooks-ad-transparency-system-isnt-nearly-good-enough.html
[https://perma.cc/D9F3-23MD]; J. Nathan Matias, Austin Hopkins & Melissa
Hounsel, We Tested Facebook’s Ad Screeners and Some Were Too Strict,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/
11/do-big-social-media-platforms-have-effective-ad-policies/574609/
[https://perma.cc/2G7N-PPS3]; Ali Breland, Dems push Facebook to fix
“unacceptable” political ad transparency tools, HILL (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/414524-dem-senators-push-facebook-toclean-up-political-ad-transparency-loopholes [https://perma.cc/U6DE-YZ7M].
96
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Conduct agreements with the European Union, which held off
coercive measures. 101
Voluntary reforms can benefit governments too. Effectively
regulating tech companies will be extremely difficult, and if done
poorly, governments may be left taking the blame for poor
outcomes. Self-regulatory reform at Facebook may make a lack of
governmental regulation more politically tenable for politicians by
showing some form of progress. Authoritarian states use formal
compliance with constitutional requirements in this way, to help
reduce the political costs for other states to maintain alliances. 102 A
recent report commissioned by the French government shows this
dynamic playing out, with Facebook’s voluntary reforms
influencing the model of regulation ultimately endorsed by the
report’s authors. They recommended a model that focused on
“expanding and legitimizing” platform self-regulation based on “the
progress made in the last 12 months by . . . Facebook,” 103 showing
that self-imposed platform reform and regulatory reform occur in
dialogue with one another. 104
In some countries, the reform may be more anticipatory than
others. In the U.S., the FOB might be seen as an attempt to preempt
calls to narrow intermediary immunity provisions to deny platforms
protection if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent their
services being used maliciously. 105 In other countries, the reform
may merely be responsive to certain regulations that have already
been put in place. A notable example is recent regulation in
Germany that Facebook’s head of policy for Europe has described
as already “pushing us to the role of the court, the role of the legal
Citron, supra note 13, at 1041–44.
Moustafa & Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 6 (giving the examples of postwar
Korea and Taiwan, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos).
103
FRENCH SEC'Y OF STATE FOR DIGITAL AFFAIRS, REGULATION OF SOCIAL
NETWORKS – FACEBOOK EXPERIMENT (May 2019).
104
For more on this relationship between voluntary initiatives and government
regulation, see Emily B. Laidlaw, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE:
GATEKEEPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 78-83
(2015).
105
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).
101
102
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system.” 106 In either case, Facebook’s establishment of the FOB
makes it not merely a passive recipient of regulatory mandates but a
proactive player in the design of the future of Internet governance.
3.

Outsourcing Controversy
For many of the issues that arise in the course of content
moderation, there will be no “right” answer and any decision is
likely to upset a certain constituency. The FOB allows Facebook to
pass the responsibility for these divisive decisions to an independent
body: a renunciation of power in the hope of also outsourcing some
of the blame for contentious choices.
A desire for Facebook to no longer bear the brunt of public
opprobrium for content moderation decisions is evident in
Zuckerberg’s call for third-party bodies to set global standards for
“harmful content.” 107 A more independent body set up by regulators
would further distance Facebook from these choices, but global
cooperation is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future, if ever.
Setting up the FOB might be seen as the next-best alternative.
Democratic 108 and authoritarian regimes 109 alike use courts as a
shield for controversy that can attend divisive political decisions. 110
Despite having “no influence over either the sword or the purse,” 111
Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Far Should Facebook Go in Regulating
Users’ Speech?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://static.nytimes.com/emailcontent/INT_9276.html?nlid=78801897 [https://perma.cc/CM6N-ML79].
107
Zuckerberg, supra note 96.
108
GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY,
JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003); Keith E. Whittington,
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial
Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005).
109
Moustafa, supra note 36, at 286.
110
Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to
the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 43 (1993) (“[T]he aim of legislative
deference to the judiciary is for the courts to make controversial policies that
political elites approve of but cannot publicly champion, and to do so in such a
way that these elites are not held accountable by the general public, or at least not
as accountable as they would be had they personally voted for that policy[.]”);
Vanberg, supra note 93, at 108 (“Rather than make decisions that carry an
electoral risk, officials may prefer to pass such issues off to someone else,
including the judiciary. However, this strategy of ‘passing the buck’ only works
if the other actor is independent.”].
111
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
106
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courts are obeyed by other governmental actors at least in part
because “[d]isaffected citizens can then blame the [courts], not
elected officials, for their disappointments.” 112
The motivation to avert blame is not limited to governments—
other actors can also use the law to avoid social backlash for their
decisions. For example, many voluntarily segregated restaurants and
hotels lobbied for civil rights legislation that would have forced
them to desegregate. 113 Segregation was commercially costly for
hotels, depriving them of black customers, but voluntarily
desegregating would have imposed a social cost in their prejudiced
communities. Civil rights legislation made desegregation a matter
of legal compliance rather than a decision with social meaning, and
outsourced the value judgment. 114
Similarly, when the FOB decides that a certain popular
commentator should be banned for sprouting hate speech or that
certain misleading political content should be left up rather than
completely removed, Facebook can cast implementing these
decisions as mere compliance rather than its own politically-charged
decisions. This fits with Facebook’s own professed image as
apolitical, and agnostic as to the ideology of content on its
platform. 115 Facebook does not want to take sides in the culture wars,
presumably because doing so would alienate segments of its
FALLON, supra note 76, at 115.
Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, 85 SOC. RES. 73 (2017); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 966 (1995).
114
Sunstein, supra note 113, at 79 (“[T]hey wanted not to discriminate, because
discrimination on their part was costly. But in light of prevailing norms, they
would also have incurred a high cost for not discriminating, which would have
provoked a hostile reaction in their community. As Lawrence Lessig writes, ‘for
a white to serve or hire blacks was for the white to mark him or herself as having
either a special greed for money or a special affection for blacks.’ In these
circumstances, the force of the law was needed to alter the social meaning of nondiscrimination. Once the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, nondiscrimination was a matter of compliance. Profit-making companies were
liberated.”) (citations omitted).
115
See Nick Statt, Zuckerberg calls Facebook ‘a platform for all ideas’ after
meeting with conservatives, VERGE (May 18, 2016), https://www.theverge.com
/2016/5/18/11706266/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-conservative-newscensorship-meeting [https://perma.cc/9PFE-2GXS].
112
113
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customer base. After all, Republicans buy shoes from Facebook ads
too. 116
Of course, there are limits to the extent to which Facebook can
avoid responsibility for what it allows on its platform. As one
representative has written, “[t]o be clear, we are not asking a group
of experts to make decisions for us. We are, however, asking for
their insights to help inform our thinking and hold us accountable.
We’ll still be making hard decisions every day, and we accept the
full weight of that responsibility.” 117 Facebook cannot be seen to be
trying to wash its hands of the problems its platform creates, nor
does it want to completely renounce control over important content
decisions that define the user experience. Finding the right balance
will no doubt involve a degree of ongoing calibration.
4.

Enforcing Existing Standards
To a limited extent, the FOB might also help not only with
changing or filling in gaps in Facebook’s policies, but also with
enforcing the policies that Facebook already has. In any complex
system, enforcement error is inevitable. As Zuckerberg says in his
Blueprint, “[t]he vast majority of mistakes we make are due to errors
enforcing the nuances of our policies rather than disagreements
about what those policies should actually be.” 118 An appeals body
can be a useful mechanism for monitoring the performance of and
correcting errors in the application of its existing standards. It has
the advantage of distributing the burden of finding mistakes by
making private parties bear the cost of rectifying errors by bringing
cases. This is how many authoritarian regimes use a system of
administrative law courts, to resolve principal-agent problems in the

See Laura Wagner, “Republicans Buy Sneakers, Too,” SLATE (July 28,
2016),
https://slate.com/culture/2016/07/did-michael-jordan-really-sayrepublicans-buy-sneakers-too.html [https://perma.cc/6B2M-64FG].
117
Ime Archibong, Strengthening Safety and Encouraging Free Expression:
Facebook’s Goals for a New Content Oversight Board, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Mar.
26,
2019),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/ime-op-ed/
[https://perma.cc/6D52-PHBY].
118
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
116
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administration of their policies that cannot be resolved through
centralized monitoring alone. 119
Facebook may, for example, be satisfied that it has drawn the
appropriate line in its definition of hate speech. 120 But this highly
contextual and sensitive judgment call will not always be
implemented correctly by context-blind AI tools or the burnt-out,
time-pressured, and geographically-distributed contractors that are
charged with implementing these rules. 121 Currently, it is not
uncommon for external parties to find such errors and to extract
apologies from Facebook once they draw public attention to the
mistakes. 122 Creating the FOB formalizes this process and redirects
the public outrage into a predetermined process for the resolution of
disputes. This has the added benefit of encouraging engagement
with the platform and its rules, rather than mere criticism or flight. 123

See Tom Ginsburg, Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents
in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 58, 59 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008)
(“To resolve the problem and prevent agency slack, all rulers need mechanisms
to monitor agents’ performance and to discipline agents who do not obey
instructions.”); Moustafa, supra note 92, at 140–41.
120
Facebook defines hate speech as “a direct attack on people based on what
we call protected characteristics—race, ethnicity, national origin, religious
affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity and serious
disease or disability. We also provide some protections for immigration status.
We define ‘attack’ as violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority,
or calls for exclusion or segregation.” FACEBOOK, supra note 25.
121
See Roberts, supra note 20; see also THE CLEANERS documentary.
122
See, e.g., Ariana Tobin et al., Facebook’s Uneven Enforcement of Hate
Speech Rules Allows Vile Posts to Stay Up, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enforcement-hate-speech-rulesmistakes [https://perma.cc/DY23-WJGA]; Amy Pollard, Facebook Found “Hate
Speech” in the Declaration of Independence, SLATE (July 5, 2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/07/facebook-found-hate-speech-in-thedeclaration-of-independence.html [https://perma.cc/2DKV-GKG5]; Sam Levin
et al., Facebook Backs Down From “Napalm Girl” Censorship and Reinstates
Photo, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/sep/09/facebook-reinstates-napalm-girl-photo
[https://perma.cc/CB2MZMMM].
123
See STONE SWEET, supra note 8, at 141 for a similar interpretation of the
exercise of delegation of disputes to a court as a legitimation.
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This process of engagement keeps users invested in the site and
creates a kind of buy-in.
But it is important to be realistic about the extent of this function
for the FOB: the FOB will only be able to hear and decide appeals
in the tiniest fraction of content moderation decisions Facebook
makes. Error correction cannot be its primary goal; it will be a
collateral benefit only. And the extent to which regulators are
persuaded to stay their hand and the public no longer blames
Facebook alone for controversial decisions is dependent on whether
the FOB itself is seen as legitimate and independent. Legitimacy is
therefore the crux of the FOB experiment. Before discussing the
fundamental challenge of creating legitimacy, the next section
sketches the broad strokes of the FOB’s institutional design.
III.
THE FOB BLUEPRINT
Many details about the final institutional design of the FOB
remain unknown at the time of writing. 124 Zuckerberg’s Blueprint
and the later released Draft Charter literally ask more questions than
they answer. In his blog post, Zuckerberg asked: “how are members
of the body selected? How do we ensure their independence from
Facebook, but also their commitment to the principles they must
uphold? How do people petition this body? How does the body pick
which cases to hear from potentially millions of requests? “ 125 As
one report put it, “[a]ll the major questions remain unanswered.” 126
The Draft Charter starts to fill in some details on the blueprint, but
This section draws on Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s ‘Draft Charter’ for
Content Moderation: Vague, But Promising, LAWFARE (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-draft-charter-content-moderationvague-promising [https://perma.cc/46NF-8PQU]; see also Evelyn Douek & Kate
Klonick, Facebook Releases an Update on Its Oversight Board: Many Questions,
Few Answers, LAWFARE (June 27, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
facebook-releases-update-its-oversight-board-many-questions-few-answers
[https://perma.cc/546D-T38A]; Evelyn Douek, Verified Accountability: SelfRegulation of Content Moderation as an Answer to the Special Problems of
Speech Governance, HOOVER AEGIS SERIES NO. 1903 (2019). This article reflects
publicly available information about the FOB as of September 2019.
125
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
126
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 20.
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itself acknowledges that it is only a “starting point.” 127 Nevertheless,
these documents do provide a rough picture of what the FOB will
look like.
Throughout the development process, one noticeable shift has
been the abandonment of the comparison of the FOB to the
“Supreme Court.” This is welcome, and this paper argues that the
ultimate design should go even further in this direction. Some
scholars have suggested that the effectiveness of the FOB “will
depend on the answer to one key question: How much will the
‘Supreme Court of Facebook’ be like the Supreme Court of the
United States?” 128 Of course, the recourse of commentators and
Zuckerberg to the analogy of the Supreme Court of the United States
is not surprising. Facebook is an intrinsically American company,
and its staff are acculturated in American culture and legal norms. 129
But focusing on a comparison to the U.S. legal system would be an
unduly narrow view. Facebook is a global company. What’s more,
since the U.S. Constitution was written, nearly 1,000 different
constitutional systems have been created from which much has been
learned. 130 Some of the details in the Draft Charter, described below,
show Facebook is open to these lessons and to institutional
innovation.
A. Membership
Ultimately, the individuals selected for the FOB will be
enormously consequential for the quality of its decisions and the
success of the project. But members will be helped or hindered by
their institutional context. The Draft Charter announces that the
FOB will be comprised of “up to 40 global experts,” selected on the
basis of publicly available qualifications as well as geographical,

DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2.
Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/
opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html [https://perma.cc/8YTD-C54Q].
129
Klonick, supra note 40, at 1621.
130
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 6
(2009).
127
128
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cultural, personal, and professional diversity. 131 Deciding the size of
the board involves a trade-off: a smaller group of members would
create a greater concentration of expertise and authority, while a
larger group would be more diverse and possibly able to hear more
cases. Choosing to have members from varied professional
backgrounds also shows this preference for diverse perspectives,
instead of selecting members who would have a common set of
professional norms and a shared discursive toolbox.
The choice not to prioritize accumulation of expertise and
authority will be exacerbated by Board members’ relatively short
terms—fixed at three years and automatically renewable once,
subject to removal for violation of terms of their appointment. 132
Compensation will be set in advance and unchangeable. 133 The fixed
tenure and compensation are important—these indicia are “the gold
standard of independence” and essential to preserve members’
independence from Facebook. 134 But the short term length does
undermine this somewhat. Perhaps life tenure (as for U.S. federal
judges and justices) is not necessary, feasible, or desirable for
Facebook, but the international norm for judicial office on final
courts of appeal is terms of around nine to fourteen years. 135 The
choice of a shorter term not only gives members less time to develop
their understanding of their role and the Facebook content
As to professional diversity, the Draft Charter says “The board will be made
of experts with experience in content, privacy, free expression, human rights,
journalism, civil rights, safety and other relevant disciplines.” DRAFT CHARTER,
supra note 2, at 1.
132
Id. at 2 (the final Charter allows for members’ terms to be renewed twice).
133
Id. at 4.
134
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[N]othing will contribute
so much as [permanent tenure of judicial offices] to that independent spirit in the
judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.”).
135
See Mark Tushnet, Judicial Accountability in Comparative Perspective, in
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION 57, 57, 61–62
(Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 2013); David S. Law, How To Rig the
Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779, 786 (2011) (“It is perhaps typical to think of
appointment for life and protection against diminution in salary as the gold
standards of judicial independence.”); Frank Cross, Judicial Independence, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 567 (Gregory A. Caldeira et al.
eds., 2008); Vanberg, supra note 93, at 101; Stone Sweet, supra note 90, at 824
(suggesting term of 9–12 years is typical).
131

OCT. 2019]

Facebook's Oversight Board

31

moderation ecosystem, but may also mean FOB members are
unduly concerned with their career prospects post-service. 136 This
perverse incentive to consider their own interests might be further
aggravated by the fact that members will only be serving in a parttime capacity. 137 Indeed, this was promoted as a benefit by Noah
Feldman in an early white paper on the FOB, arguing “[r]eputational
effects will be important to them. They will be mid-career actors, so
that they will have other interests and goals alongside their
Facebook judicial position.” 138 While it is true, as Feldman argues,
that this will reduce pressure to break professional norms and
engage in attention-seeking behavior, having shorter, part-time
terms increases the salience of board members’ personal interests
rather than their institutional responsibility. These concerns might
be somewhat mitigated by the fact that “individual members’ names
will not be associated with particular decisions.” 139 Granting
anonymity may protect against pressure to vote in a particular way
on any given case, and increase the desire to bolster the legitimacy
of the institution as a whole with respect-worthy decisions.
Overall, these choices reflect a theme that dominates the Draft
Charter: the importance of diversity. Indeed, the words “diverse” or
“diversity” are used six times in two pages. 140 The reason for this is
clear. Facebook has long been criticized for the lack of diversity in
its leadership, product design, and content moderation teams. 141 This
Tushnet, supra note 135, at 61–62
([I]f reappointment is precluded, judges may shape their decisions with an eye to
their prospects for post-service employment, which may promote indirect
accountability to someone, though notnecessarily the public. And, for obvious
reasons, these effects may differ depending on the age at which judges take their
positions on apex courts, and whether they are subject to rules requiring or norms
encouraging retirement at a specific age or restrictions on post-service
employment.).
137
See DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 2.
138
Brent Harris, Global Feedback & Input on the Facebook Oversight Board
for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 27, 2019),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/global-feedback-on-oversight-board/
[https://perma.cc/YUW9-SWUN].
139
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 4.
140
Id. at 1–2.
141
See, e.g., Jaime Dunaway, Lawmakers Press Zuckerberg on Facebook’s
Diversity Problem—and He Had an Answer Ready, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2018),
136
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has affected the company’s ability to anticipate and understand how
its platform impacts its diverse global user base. Many of the biggest
content moderation controversies have involved the harsher
operation of Facebook’s rules on minorities, for example. 142 Greater
diversity enhances the legitimacy of courts’ decisions in the eyes of
the public, and especially for those minorities that previously lacked
representation. 143 Facebook has written that “[t]he success and the
ultimate effectiveness of the Oversight Board will depend on its
ability to accommodate an inclusive and diverse range of
perspectives, across language, culture and experience.” 144 And in a
global consultation process on the FOB, “many stressed the need for
the Board’s composition to reflect as many segments of society as
possible.” 145
But this may set an impossible target. The FOB cannot
encompass diversity sufficient to represent the views of a user base
that is perhaps the most diverse “community” ever assembled. The
https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/lawmakers-question-mark-zuckerberg-onfacebooks-employment-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/9ZE3-AWEW]; Tom
Simonite, AI Is the Future—But Where Are the Women?, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-researchers-genderimbalance [https://perma.cc/A3MK-N22J]; Dave Lee, Who’s Policing
Facebook?, BBC (May 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology44206996 [https://perma.cc/AG68-RS49].
142
See, e.g., Mara Schechter, Update: 570k+ People Call on Facebook to Stop
Censoring Activists, DAILY KOS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.dailykos.com/
story/2017/3/3/1639597/-Update-570k-people-call-on-Facebook-to-stopcensoring-activists [https://perma.cc/9X4H-QZ24] (reporting on a letter from
civil rights organizations, including the ACLU, criticizing Facebook: “Activists
in the Movement for Black Lives have routinely reported the takedown of images
discussing racism and during protests, with the justification that it violates
Facebook’s Community Standards. At the same time, harassment and threats
directed at activists based on their race, religion, and sexual orientation is thriving
on Facebook.”); Angwin & Grassegger, supra note 51.
143
See, e.g., Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal
Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587 (2011);
Nancy Scherer & Brett Curry, Does Descriptive Race Representation Enhance
Institutional Legitimacy? The Case of the U.S. Courts, 72 J. OF POLITICS 90
(2010); Stone Sweet, supra note 90 (noting also the importance of diversity of
expertise).
144
Archibong, supra note 117.
145
Harris, supra note 138, at 20.
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U.S. Supreme Court has been criticized for failing to reflect the
diversity of its single-country jurisdiction. 146 Consider, then, that the
FOB’s jurisdiction is not a single country, but spans the globe. One
report noted that “[c]reating a body that has credibility with the
extraordinarily wide geographical, cultural, and political range of
Facebook users would be a major challenge.” 147 This is an
understatement. It is not just that the FOB cannot hope to represent
every single view, or cannot “include representatives from every
country and culture.” 148 It cannot hope to represent even a
meaningful fraction of those views. This is especially so given that
the forty-member FOB will not sit as a whole in each case, but will
instead hear cases in panels. 149 A forty-member body is not even
large enough to include a representative from each of Africa’s fiftyfour countries. Facebook acknowledges Africa is a “complex
tapestry of cultures,” but then proceeds to flatten this diversity by
saying “Africa will be represented on the board alongside other
regions.” 150 There is no reason to believe, for example, that any
representative from Africa will have the expertise and legitimacy
necessary to issue authoritative pronouncements on issues as diverse
as Nigerian fake news 151 to Libyan “keyboard warriors” who carry
out online partisan battles. 152
Rather than pretending that the FOB itself can be sufficiently
diverse to be representative of Facebook users, the limits of this
capacity should be factored into the FOB’s design. There is no single
Valerie Strauss, The ‘Cloistered’ Harvard-Yale Law Monopoly on the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/07/10/the-cloistered-harvard-yale-law-monopolyon-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/QE4J-8UTZ].
147
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 20.
148
Archibong, supra note 117.
149
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3.
150
Archibong, supra note 117.
151
Yemisi Adegoke et al., Like. Share. Kill., BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/nigeria_fake_news?utm_campaign
=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter
[https://perma.cc/NZ2C-SGBC].
152
Declan Walsh & Suliman Ali Zway, A Facebook War: Libyans Battle on the
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2018),
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N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/world/middleeast/libya-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/8KVX-VXTJ].
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body that could represent a community the size and scale of
Facebook. The FOB will instead need to be empowered to reach out
to different experts and communities who have relevant perspectives
to offer in any individual case. Facebook is not wrong that the
legitimacy and therefore success of the FOB will depend in large
part on its capacity to bring greater diversity to Facebook’s content
moderation system, but it will need to find ways to do this other than
through FOB membership alone.
B. Power of Review
The Draft Charter states that the “primary function of the board
is to review specific decisions we make when enforcing our
Community Standards.” 153 As noted above, this may be the primary
activity of the FOB, but it cannot be its primary function. Given the
sheer volume of content moderation decisions that Facebook makes
every day, the FOB’s impact would be miniscule if its function were
purely error correction in individual cases. Other aspects of the Draft
Charter suggest Facebook appreciates this broader purpose.
Crucially, the FOB’s decisions will be made public and include
an explanation. 154 If the decision of the relevant panel is not
unanimous, minority views can be included in the explanation for
the decision. 155 This shows that the purpose of the FOB is not only
to decide outcomes and correct errors, but also to give reasons—to
expose the reasoning and tensions involved in content moderation
decisions.
To guide this process, Facebook will publish a final Charter that
includes a set of values which the FOB agrees to uphold. 156 This
aims to make the basis for the FOB’s decisions more transparent,
thereby ensuring “the public legitimacy of the board will grow.” 157
FOB panels should “ensure consistency with other issued
opinions” 158 so that its decisions create a coherent body of “platform
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 5.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
153
154
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law.” 159 This emphasis on consistency and coherence with prior
decisions invokes notions of stare decisis, the legal doctrine of
precedent. Given this reliance on a fundamental concept of legal
training, it is again notable that not all members of the FOB will be
lawyers.
Given that reason-giving is central to the FOB’s role, its
institutional design should be centered around facilitating the
production of quality decisions. Again, this involves trade-offs, the
most obvious being speed of decision-making in order to ensure that
by the time the case is decided there is still the possibility of a
substantive remedy. If a take-down decision comes too late, the
damage of a viral post may already be done. The importance of
speed versus careful consideration may differ in each case, but the
Draft Charter indicates there will be a hard deadline of two weeks
for all FOB decisions. 160 The difficulty of this rigid timeline is
indicated by the wide range of activities that the FOB might
undertake during this time: it will be empowered to “call upon
experts to ensure it has all supplementary linguistic, cultural and
sociopolitical expertise necessary to make a decision,” 161 and other
stakeholders will also be able to submit arguments and material to
the panel. 162 This additional, inquisitorial-style evidence gathering
powers of the FOB are an essential departure from the U.S. Supreme
Court model. The factual record on which Facebook’s content
moderators base their decisions is incredibly slim—sometimes it
does not even include comments or captions that accompany a piece
of flagged content. 163 But correct content moderation decisions
depend on a proper understanding of context. The same word could
be a form of artistic expression in one context or a racial slur in
another. Political, historical, or social context may make a phrase
that seems innocuous on its face extremely provocative and even

Kaye, supra note 14, at 3.
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 5. However, it is not clear from the Draft
Charter when this clock will start running.
161
Id. at 4.
162
Id.
163
LAURA MURPHY, FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – PROGRESS REPORT 11
(June 30, 2019).
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dangerous. Proper responses to hate and disinformation depends on
an understanding of local, or even hyper-local, considerations. 164
Zuckerberg has also acknowledged that the “linguistic nuances”
involved in identifying hate speech and bullying pose a special
challenge for both reviewers and AI. 165 A civil rights audit found
that a key reason for errors in Facebook’s moderation of hate speech
was insufficient attention to context. 166 The FOB’s role in
considering extra context and correcting errors will therefore be
especially important in these cases.
In difficult cases, then, the extent of the material necessary for
the FOB to make a well-informed decision could be vast, or the
logistics of finding and hearing from necessary experts might be
challenging. But because of the limitations on the FOB’s ability to
adequately represent the full diversity of Facebook users, as noted
above, this expertise-gathering should be given ample space to
occur. In this context, a two-week deadline seems somewhat
arbitrary: a functional board would itself determine the correct
balance in each case. It is unclear why a strict standard of two weeks
strikes a good balance—a fortnight is an eternity in terms of the
Internet zeitgeist (justice delayed is virality denied) but perhaps not
long enough for a multi-member board to gather and consider all the
materials it needs.
Another notable departure from the U.S. model is the FOB being
given a kind of “abstract” jurisdiction. 167 Facebook has indicated
that beyond deciding individual cases, the company “may request
policy guidance from the board.” 168 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction hinges on the finding of a specific “case or

CHINMAYI ARUN, REBALANCING REGULATION OF SPEECH: HYPER-LOCAL
CONTENT ON GLOBAL WEB-BASED PLATFORMS (2018); David Kaye, Four
Questions About Regulating Online Hate Speech, MEDIUM (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://onezero.medium.com/four-questions-about-online-hate-speechae3e0a134472 [https://perma.cc/3D7Z-G6N6].
165
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
166
Murphy, supra note 163, at 11.
167
Stone Sweet, supra note 90, at 818.
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controversy,” 169 but an abstract jurisdiction for the FOB will
empower it to highlight problems in Facebook’s rules in advance of
individuals bringing appeals about them. This capacity could be
further enhanced by the creation of a concrete review jurisdiction, 170
where moderators might escalate matters to review in hard cases
where they are uncertain about how the Community Standards
should be applied, in advance of a user-initiated appeal. This would
have the advantage of potentially heading off controversy created
by moderators being forced to make a decision in hard cases without
the benefit of full consideration. The power to assess the
appropriateness of rules and not merely the application of them in a
particular case is an important one, discussed further below, and
should be available beyond Facebook’s discretion to refer such
cases.
Many questions remain about how, in practice, the FOB will
exercise these powers of review. Not least among them are
“standing” rules about who is qualified to bring an appeal (just the
user who posted the content, for example, or third parties?), the form
of argumentation (will there be a Facebook bar who argues before
the FOB in person?), how cases will be selected from the large
volume of contested decisions, how to support “litigants” to ensure
that access to the FOB is not limited to the well-resourced, who will
bear the burden of proof to establish error, what kind of evidence the
FOB will consider, and innumerable other questions. These
decisions will impact the FOB’s legitimacy, and many will likely be
worked out over time. This article is concerned with institutional
design of the FOB at a higher level of generality, and so these
questions are set aside for now. But once the FOB is operational,
these questions will become more urgent and salient in how it is
perceived.
C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
For the FOB to meaningfully contribute to Facebook’s content
moderation ecosystem, its subject-matter jurisdiction—that is, the
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This is a common feature in the ideal type of
a constitutional court. Stone Sweet, supra note 90, at 818.
170
STONE SWEET, supra note 8, at 45.
169
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topics on which it is empowered to hear cases—should reflect the
wide ambit of ways Facebook decides what appears on its platform.
Two things are worth noting about the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the FOB. First, the FOB “will not decide cases where
reversing Facebook’s decision would violate the law.” 171 This
reflects Facebook’s general position that it will respect local laws in
the countries it operates. 172 Facebook follows local laws because
they “are often the result of public input, even just the indirect
influence of a democratic election. The laws are therefore likely to
reflect, at least in democracies, the social values of the local
population.” 173 This restriction on the FOB’s jurisdiction is not
surprising: indeed, where local law conflicts with Facebook’s rules,
the FOB would have limited power to mandate that Facebook
disobey legal requirements. But a consequence of this is that
governments have de facto control over the FOB’s remit. A
government can prevent the FOB from giving an opinion on a matter
if it makes a particular type of content illegal. As Feldman
acknowledges, “[i]t would be plausible to eliminate this provision
from the proposal altogether. The idea would be to discourage states
from enacting laws that limit expression and hence gaining control
over content on Facebook.” 174 This provision also undermines
Facebook’s professed desire to have a universal set of Community
Standards. In practice, and particularly in countries where
governments seek to exercise tight control over public discourse,
carving out disputes under local law may be a severe limitation.
National and international laws about free speech and online content
are proliferating and diverse. 175 Even within a single jurisdiction,
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3.
Bickert, supra note 31, at 258.
173
Id.
174
Harris, supra note 138, at 142; Noah Feldman, Facebook Supreme Court: A
Governance Solution, in GLOBAL FEEDBACK AND INPUT ON THE FACEBOOK
OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS: APPENDIX 104, 106 (2019)
(emphasis added).
175
See, e.g., ERIC GOLDMAN, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES’ SECTION
230 INTERNET IMMUNITY, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper,
2018); see also Daniel Funke, A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the
world, POYNTER (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2019/aguide-to-anti-misinformation-actions-around-the-world/
171
172
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different courts can come to different conclusions on the meaning of
relevant laws and whether certain content is illegal. 176
A key anterior question in these cases will be who decides
whether a take-down decision was taken due to local legal
requirements or Facebook’s own Community Standards. If
Facebook itself decides this question, this too undermines the FOB’s
oversight capacity by giving Facebook a way of deciding that certain
cases should not reach the FOB. Facebook could determine, without
the possibility of review, that the FOB cannot hear a particular case.
This may be exacerbated by the fact that when legal liability is not
clear, platforms tend to err on the side of caution. 177
The second notable thing about the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the FOB is its overall narrowness. Apart from possible abstract
review referrals by Facebook, the FOB is limited to reviewing
individual applications of Facebook’s Community Standards. The
biggest controversies around content moderation for Facebook in
the last few years have concerned its decisions to take down, or not
take down, putative hate speech, 178 foreign interference in domestic
elections, 179 and other forms of misinformation and disinformation
(including so-called “fake news,” 180 “deepfakes” and
[https://perma.cc/G6QE-2ABU] (summarizing laws targeting disinformation
alone).
176
See, e.g., Nele Achten, Social Media Content Moderation: The German
Regulation Debate, LAWFARE (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
social-media-content-moderation-german-regulation-debate [https://perma.cc/
R8M3-3JYC] (describing German rulings on NetzDG laws).
177
DAPHNE KELLER, HOOVER INST., OBSERVATIONS ON SPEECH, DANGER, AND
MONEY 2 (2018); Kaye, supra note 14, at 7.
178
Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Moves to Limit Toxic Content as Scandal Swirls,
WIRED (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-limits-hatespeech-toxic-content/ [https://perma.cc/5AEZ-6PJC].
179
Sheera Frenkel & Mike Isaac, Facebook ‘Better Prepared’ to Fight Election
Interference, Mark Zuckerberg Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/technology/facebook-elections-markzuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/YQ5C-6F8Q].
180
Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News
Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-newsoutperformed-real-news-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/MDX3-5ATK]; Adam
Mosseri, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK MEDIA
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“cheapfakes” 181). But these are not the only important types of
content moderation decisions Facebook makes. Allowing tech
companies to frame “content decisions” or “content moderation” in
such a limited way would get in the way of creating meaningful
oversight and instead result in a type of transparency theatre.
As examples, there are at least two other key areas of “content
decisions” that the FOB should have jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes under, both of which would be a more significant
abdication of authority by the company. The first is algorithmic
ranking decisions, and in particular the decision to down-rank
certain content and decrease its circulation. The second is the
application of its advertising policies, especially those around
compliance with the additional new requirements Facebook has put
in place concerning political ads.
Both of these decisions go much more directly to the core of
Facebook’s business model than individual content moderation
decisions about whether user posts comply with the Community
Standards. The Facebook News Feed algorithm is Facebook’s
“secret sauce,” 182 that drives user engagement. Facebook is

(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stopmisinformation-and-false-news [https://perma.cc/4UVB-6HB9].
181
Robert Chesney et al., About That Pelosi Video: What to Do About
(May
29,
2019),
‘Cheapfakes’
in
2020,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/about-pelosi-video-what-do-about-cheapfakes2020 [https://perma.cc/STC4-VCWS].
182
THE FACEBOOK DILEMMA, Frontline, Part I at 12:22 (Antonio Garcia
Martinez, former product manager at Facebook).
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notoriously protective of its algorithm,183 and users, 184 academics, 185
civil society, 186 and lawmakers 187 have long been calling for greater
transparency around how Facebook determines what gets shown in
the News Feed. Advertising is the backbone of Facebook’s
business. 188 Facebook might be concerned that giving the FOB
power to review decisions in these domains risks too much
intervention in the platform’s core product design and revenue
stream. But denying this jurisdiction undermines any claim that the
Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s
_news_feed_algorithm_works.html
[https://perma.cc/GX6A-6R7Y];
Max
Mason, Facebook lashes algorithm regulatory oversight as “unworkable,”
AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.afr.com/business/mediaand-marketing/advertising/facebook-lashes-algorithm-regulatory-oversight-asunworkable-20181212-h191da [https://perma.cc/4WRC-QG26].
184
Pete Brown, Study: Readers Are Hungry for News Feed Transparency,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/
study-readers-hungry-news-feed-transparency-algorithms.php [https://perma.cc/
YS2D-G8RF].
185
DAVID M.J. LAZER ET AL., ADDRESSING FAKE NEWS REQUIRES A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT 4 (2018).
186
Corynne McSherry Cohn, Jillian C. York, & Cindy Cohn, Private
Censorship Is Not the Best Way to Fight Hate or Defend Democracy: Here Are
Some Better Ideas, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/private-censorship-not-best-way-fighthate-or-defend-democracy-here-are-some
[https://perma.cc/LKL6-A6PC];
Emma Llanso, Is Holocaust Denial Free Speech? Facebook Needs to Be More
Transparent, FORTUNE (July 24, 2018) http://fortune.com/2018/07/24/facebookmark-zuckerberg-holocaust-denial-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/9GSC-AUKE].
187
Alexander Pirang, Germany Wants Greater Algorithmic Transparency to
Fight Disinformation, But Its Approach Is Half-Baked, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/germany-wants-greateralgorithmic-transparency-fight-disinformation-its-approach-half-baked
[https://perma.cc/AD94-L52D]; Evelyn Douek, Congress’ Grilling of Tech
Companies in 2017 Foreshadows the Debates of 2018, LAWFARE (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-grilling-tech-companies-2017foreshadows-debates-2018 [https://perma.cc/A4NH-7YXC].
188
Emily Stewart, Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Seem Really
Confused about Facebook, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/4/10/17222062/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-graham-facebookregulations [https://perma.cc/F4WC-RAVT] (when asked by Senator Orrin Hatch
about how Facebook sustained a business model when users do not pay for their
service, Zuckerberg famously replied “Senator, we run ads.”).
183
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FOB is a meaningful and bona fide attempt to give greater rigor and
transparency to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem as a
whole. Indeed, confining the scope of jurisdiction of courts is a
common technique used by authoritarian regimes to undermine the
check on power that an independent judiciary might otherwise
provide. 189 As Martin Shapiro has observed, “[a] relatively
independent judiciary may be preserved but simply excluded from
domains significant to the authoritarian regime.” 190 As the rest of this
section shows, both ranking and advertising decisions are core
content moderation matters, and a body that is intended to provide
“oversight” to content decisions needs to be empowered to review
them.
A Degree of Algorithmic Transparency
Often, content moderation conversations revolve around a “take
down / leave up” dichotomy. But platforms have far greater capacity
to control the content on their sites than this paradigm suggests.
Facebook is increasingly relying not on the blunter content
moderation tools of removing posts or pages, but on the subtler tools
of limiting their reach and exposure. For “borderline” content in
each of its harmful categories, Facebook works to “distribute that
content less” to reduce the incentive to post such content. 191
Zuckerberg argues that “no matter where we draw the lines for what
is allowed, as a piece of content gets close to that line, people will
engage with it more on average.” 192 But Facebook’s decision to
“downrank” a piece of content (or distribute it less) in users’ News
189
Moustafa, supra note 36; Law, supra note 135, at 812 n.150 (describing how
Taiwan’s legislative body changed the quorum requirements for the issuance of
constitutional interpretations in order to substantially diminish such rulings);
CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 78–79 (Cheryl Thomas
trans., Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, 2002) (“[T]he kind of disputes a judge can be
asked to settle . . . provides the starting point for assessing the scope of courts. . . .
Authoritarian regimes often adopt [a] fragmentation strategy to control the
administration of justice.”); Landau & Dixon, supra note 81, at 30.
190
Martin Shapiro, Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 326, 331 (Tamir Moustafa &
Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008).
191
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
192
Id.
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Feeds is currently much less transparent than a decision to take down
a piece of content. Users are typically notified when a post is
removed entirely, but, because users are not told how their posts are
treated by the News Feed algorithm, may be entirely unaware when
their post is left up but just not shown to other users. From
Facebook’s perspective, this is a key virtue of this approach. As the
company notes in a recent patent for this practice, when it is used
“the commenting user is not made aware that his or her comment
was blocked, thereby providing fewer incentives to the commenting
user to spam the page or attempt to circumvent the social networking
system filters.” 193
Opacity in Facebook’s ranking decisions leaves users guessing
at what is happening, and speculating if this is the cause of any drop
in engagement with their posts. Some (including President Trump)
have suggested that social media platforms “shadow ban” 194 posts
simply because they do not like them. 195
Crucially, if the FOB cannot review down ranking decisions not
only will this speculation persist, but also Facebook can still
effectively control the extent to which the FOB can provide
oversight: if Facebook does not want a takedown to be subject of
public attention and the FOB’s review, Facebook could simply
downrank that content effectively out of circulation instead of
removing it.
Facebook’s content moderation includes decisions about how to
distribute content Facebook does not take down. Therefore, to give
legitimacy to this wider ecosystem the FOB needs jurisdiction over
these decisions. Of course, in a sense, every piece of content on
Facebook is subject to a degree of algorithmic content moderation.
Bryan Menegus, Facebook Patents Shadowbanning, GIZMODO (July 16,
2019),
https://gizmodo.com/facebook-patents-shadowbanning-1836411346
[https://perma.cc/YTD8-N4HP].
194
G.F., What is “Shadowbanning”?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/01/what-isshadowbanning [https://perma.cc/L8RM-GCQN].
195
Tal Axelrod, Trump: Facebook, Twitter and Google Bias is ‘Ridiculous,’
HILL (Dec. 18, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/421820trump-facebook-twitter-and-google-bias-is-ridiculous [https://perma.cc/K2W52QUQ].
193
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Facebook has famously jealously guarded the workings of its News
Feed algorithm, to prevent user gaming and for trade secrets reasons.
There may be a legitimate argument that the FOB cannot or should
not have complete oversight of all aspects of the algorithm; but at
least to the extent that algorithmic changes are used explicitly as a
tool of content moderation on the basis of lines drawn in the
Community Standards, these should be subject to FOB review.
Advertising Policies
Facebook has detailed policies on advertising and all ads
purchased undergo pre-publication review to ensure they meet
Facebook’s rules. 196 Facebook has made significant changes to its
political advertising policies in the wake of controversy surrounding
the 2016 U.S. election. Advertisers that run political ads are now
required to go through an authorization process and run disclaimers
about who paid for the ads. 197 Facebook’s definition of a political ad
includes an ad that relates to any of twenty “issues of national
importance,” a list that includes, for example, the indeterminate
category of “values.” 198 Facebook’s application of these rules has
given rise to controversy. Ads from news sites 199 and non-profits 200
were removed because they were flagged as “political” but had not
Advertising policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads#
[https://perma.cc/8WZV-GX5Z].
197
Id. (“5. Restricted Content . . . 11.a. Ads related to politics or issues of
national importance”).
198
Issues of national importance, FACEBOOK ADS HELP CENTRE, https://engb.facebook.com/business/help/214754279118974
[https://perma.cc/25BYEJN2].
199
Ariana Tobin & Jeremy B. Merrill, Facebook’s Screening for Political Ads
Nabs News Sites Instead of Politicians, PROPUBLICA (June 15, 2018),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-new-screening-system-flags-thewrong-ads-as-political [https://perma.cc/S63B-98QK].
200
Daniel Gallant, Facebook Censors at Random, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-censors-at-random-1544395970
[https://perma.cc/HY5B-DXG4]; J. Nathan Matias, Austin Hounsel, & Melissa
Hopkins, We Tested Facebook’s Ad Screeners and Some Were Too Strict,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/
11/do-big-social-media-platforms-have-effective-ad-policies/574609/
[https://perma.cc/H3GV-G5SV].
196
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received the necessary special authorization, while ads purchased in
the names of sitting Senators were waved through. 201 The individual
and societal consequences of inconsistent and opaque enforcement
of political advertising policies are potentially significant. Yet, as
Kreiss and McGregor found, Facebook “exercise[s] considerable
discretion over paid political media. While these decisions are
clearly difficult, they are made without much in the way of
transparency, consistency, or accountability.” 202 The lack of
explanation for how these policies are applied is particularly
concerning because without it “Facebook would have the authority
to determine the messages that campaigns pay for the public to see,
without the [public] challenges that keep these firms learning and
cause their policies to evolve.” 203 Without transparency, it also opens
Facebook up to the charge that its decisions are politically
motivated.
Inconsistent and unexplained decision-making is exactly the
problem the FOB is being created to solve. In the context of political
content, this is especially important. The mere fact that content is
paid and not “organic” does not alleviate the need for oversight.
Giving the FOB’s jurisdiction in these cases would put literal money
where Facebook’s mouth is about trusting the expertise of the FOB
to interpret and apply its rules in a legitimate manner.
In the report summarizing the results of its global consultation
on the FOB, Facebook said that it had been “clear” that the Board
was only going to review individual decisions under the Community
Standards and that while News Feed ranking and political
advertising were “important issues,” they were beyond the remit of
the Board. 204 But these are not just important issues: they are at the
core of Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem. Excluding them
William Turton, We Posed as 100 Senators to Run Ads on Facebook.
Facebook Approved All of Them., VICE NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/xw9n3q/we-posed-as-100-senators-to-runads-on-facebook-facebook-approved-all-of-them [https://perma.cc/P37T-9GTU].
202
Daniel Kreiss & Shannon C. McGregor, The “Arbiters of What Our Voters
See:” Facebook and Google’s Struggle with Policy, Process, and Enforcement
Around Political Advertising, POLITICAL COMM. 1, 2 (2019).
203
Id. at 11–12.
204
Harris, supra note 138.
201
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from the FOB’s jurisdiction undermines Facebook’s broader
commitment to transparency and accountability in content
moderation that the FOB is intended to facilitate.
IV.
THE LEGITIMACY CONUNDRUM
The fundamental purpose of the FOB is to bring greater
legitimacy to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem. While
enhancing the legitimacy of the FOB itself is instrumental to this
goal, it is not the ultimate aim: the aim is to legitimize Facebook’s
exercise of power by subjecting it to an independent check. The
focus of this article is therefore a more general sociological
legitimacy—that is, the extent to which the public regards
Facebook’s decisions generally as justified, appropriate, or
otherwise deserving of support beyond the fear of sanctions or mere
hope for personal reward. 205
In a crucial sense, this legitimacy can only be established over
time. For the FOB itself, as the Draft Charter notes, “[t]he public
legitimacy of the board will grow from the transparent, independent
decisions that the board makes.” 206 But gaining legitimacy will be
difficult. The FOB is being established in response to widespread
public dissatisfaction with Facebook content moderation and so the
enterprise begins on the back foot. And while the early use of the
moniker of a “Supreme Court” may have been (intentionally or
unintentionally) intended to invoke the aura of legitimacy that the
Supreme Court of the United States enjoys, the FOB will not have a
reservoir of legitimacy accumulated over a long history to draw
down upon. 207
But there are two more fundamental challenges in the quest for
legitimacy: first, the difficulty for Facebook making a credible
commitment to being bound by the FOB when, ultimately,
Facebook itself retains final authority; and second, the lack of
agreed prior norms or authorities for content moderation which the
Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795 (2004–2005) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26
(1990)).
206
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 5.
207
See Fallon, supra note 205, at 1829, 1837–38.
205
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FOB can base its decisions on and leverage into accepted
pronouncements. This part addresses each of these challenges in
turn.
A. The Limits of the FOB’s Legitimizing Power
There is a real limit on the extent of the legitimation that the
FOB can bring to Facebook content moderation. Part II(B) above
discussed the ways in which authoritarian regimes use courts to give
them a veneer of legitimacy. But as Mark Tushnet has pointed out
about this literature, “[t]he general difficulty with these accounts is
straightforward: rulers might want to make credible commitments,
but they cannot do so, precisely because they can alter the
constitution whenever they want—and the target audiences know
that these rulers can do so.” 208 In Facebook’s case, the conundrum is
the same: Zuckerberg wants to assure stakeholders that the FOB will
be independent, make decisions “in the best interests of our
community and not for commercial reasons,” 209 and that Facebook
will consider itself bound by the FOB’s decisions. But it is difficult
for Facebook to make this commitment to tie itself to the mast of the
FOB completely credible. Ultimately, Facebook does not have to
obey the FOB’s decisions or could disband the institution altogether
without cause. This is the flip side of judicial review being a
relatively low-cost way of enhancing legitimacy without opening up
the broader policy-making process—you get what you pay for.
A practical issue may also arise for Facebook of how to resolve
its fiduciary duties to its shareholders should the FOB issue a
decision that it genuinely regarded as against its commercial
interests. 210 The simple response is that the FOB can be considered
in the long-term commercial interests of the company because it
increases user satisfaction, protects company reputation, and
potentially staves off more severe regulation. But to the extent that
this is true, the FOB does not actually constitute a “check” on
Facebook’s power because its actions remain in Facebook’s best
Tushnet, supra note 92, at 422–23.
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
210
Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
208
209
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interests. As Tushnet explains, when it serves the interest of the
authoritarian for there to be an external check on its powers:
[C]ourts do no work because the regime’s immediate self-interest will
lead it to refrain from actions that reduce the returns it anticipates to gain
during the period when the preferences are stable. And, if the regime’s
preferences change, the mechanisms also do no work because the regime
is free to change them to accommodate its new preferences. 211

Similarly, should Facebook decide that the cost of public
legitimacy becomes too high, it can simply abandon its
experiment. 212
The notion that the FOB is merely instrumental to Facebook and
does not constitute a meaningful check is further suggested by a
number of design choices. The highly circumscribed and subjective
nature of the FOB’s subject-matter jurisdiction, discussed above, 213
is the most significant. But there is also the fact that Facebook has
said that the company “can incorporate the board’s decisions in the
policy development process,” 214 suggesting that this possibility is
discretionary. There is a fundamental tension for Facebook in
creating a meaningfully independent body while also keeping its
discretion within acceptable bounds. As Zuckerberg asked, “[h]ow
do we ensure their independence from Facebook, but also their
commitment to the principles they must uphold?” 215 Facebook’s
answer to this has been to require FOB members to agree to uphold
a set of values specified by Facebook. 216

211
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Tushnet, supra note 92, at 425; see also Khan & Pozen, supra note 210, at

For discussion of the fact that the FOB represents a “bet” that public
legitimacy is a worthwhile commercial investment that could be abandoned, see
Evelyn Douek, YouTube’s Bad Week and the Limitations of Laboratories of
(June
11,
2019),
Online
Governance,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/youtubes-bad-week-and-limitations-laboratoriesonline-governance [https://perma.cc/9PZG-8JZY].
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See infra Part III(C).
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B. The Limits of a “Constitution’s” Legitimizing Power
Requiring the FOB’s decisions to be based on a set of underlying
values has been likened to the adoption of a “constitution” which
will guide the FOB’s interpretation of the Community Standards. 217
These values will play an important role in the FOB’s work, but
there are crucial ways in which they are unlike a constitution. A
values statement can perform the same role as constitutions do in
expressing Facebook’s fundamental vision for its platform which
the FOB can use to resolve ambiguity in the Community Standards
in a way that reflects these commitments. But because the values
will be Facebook’s and not the user community’s, they cannot
perform the same role of legitimization that constitutions do because
there is no sense in which the values express a delegation of
authority from users or a set of widely-agreed norms.
The statement of values will play an essential role by guiding the
FOB in difficult cases where there is no clear answer. It is precisely
because there will be instances where competing understandings of
the Community Standards are possible that the FOB is necessary. If
the Community Standards provided a clear answer in every case,
there would be no need to seek review of content moderation
decisions. In cases where there are multiple possible interpretations
of these rules, what should the FOB use to decide between them?
Without a set of underlying values, decisions become relatively
unconstrained. This is suboptimal from Facebook’s perspective,
because it creates a large sphere of discretion for FOB members. But
it is also suboptimal for users and for the legitimacy of the FOB
itself: without an underlying set of commitments, decisions can
become unpredictable or seen as arbitrary.
In its Draft Charter, Facebook said it would adopt a set of values
that “would encompass concepts like voice, safety, equity, dignity,
equality and privacy.” 218 Importantly, a list of vague “values” does
not help achieve the aim of guiding the FOB’s interpretative
practice. A list that includes everything prioritizes nothing. It is hard
to disagree with the importance of each of “voice, safety, equity,
dignity, equality and privacy,” but the very nature of hard freedom
217
218

Klonick & Kadri, supra note 128.
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 5.
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of speech cases is that they involve trade-offs between these values.
The difference between various countries’ hate speech
jurisprudence, for example, is largely due to a different weighting of
these values. As Rosenfeld explains:
If free speech in the United States is shaped above all by individualism
and libertarianism, collective concerns and other values such as honor
and dignity lie at the heart of the conceptions of free speech that originate
in international covenants or in the constitutional jurisprudence of other
Western democracies. Thus, for example, Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence is more concerned with multiculturalism and groupregarding equality. For its part, the German Constitution sets the
inviolability of human dignity as its paramount value. . . . These
differences have had a profound impact on the treatment of hate
speech. 219

Albie Sachs has similarly observed:
To Americans, the firstness of the First Amendment is axiomatic. It is
seen as a source of enlightenment, as being the most constitutive and
defining element of the whole constitutional order. The legal cultures of
Germany and South Africa, however, have a profoundly different
foundational element. It is not free speech, but human dignity. What is
axiomatic to an American lawyer could be problematic to us. What is
axiomatic to us could be problematic to an American. 220

Just as AI cannot perform content moderation without coders
making value judgments in writing the algorithms, 221 so too
Facebook cannot escape the need to make a choice about the kind of
platform it wants to be. The decision of whether to allow conspiracymongerer Alex Jones to continue to stream and share violent and
sometimes racist conspiracy theories is an example where such a
choice is necessary. 222 On one side is the value of voice and liberty
Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis Conference: The Inaugural Conference of the
Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy: Fundamentalisms,
Equalities, and the Challenge to Tolerance in a Post-9/11 Environment, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1541 (2002–2003).
220
Albie Sachs, Reflections on the Firstness of the First Amendment in the
United States, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 179, 192 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2018).
221
See supra Part II(A).
222
Jane Coaston, YouTube, Facebook, and Apple’s Ban on Alex Jones,
Explained, VOX (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/6/17655658/alexjones-facebook-youtube-conspiracy-theories [https://perma.cc/N9AF-HAVE];
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to speak, but on the other hand there is the safety and dignity of
people affected by his hateful rhetoric or conspiracy-mongering.
Another example is the decision to prohibit content promoting
eating disorders, which reflects a prioritization of safety over
unconstrained voice. 223 These choices are controversial—this is part
of the reason the FOB is being set up. But an uncontroversial
statement of values that is universally acceptable would be stated at
such a level of generality to be of limited utility in constraining
decision-making.
Zuckerberg has in fact long articulated underlying values he sees
as inherent in his platform. In the opening words of his Blueprint
announcing the FOB’s creation he says “[m]any of us got into
technology because we believe it can be a democratizing force for
putting power in people’s hands. I’ve always cared about this and
that’s why the first words of our mission have always been “give
people the power.” 224 This kind of rhetoric attracts backlash, but a
transparent statement of what the platform is intended to be is
important in explaining choices made in content moderation. And
by explicitly choosing priorities in advance, this reduces the chances
that the FOB’s decision-making becomes so out of step with the
company’s vision for its platform that it decides to simply ignore or
overrule its decisions.
But although a charter that makes difficult choices will be
necessary for the FOB to function effectively, it cannot cure
Facebook’s legitimacy deficits for several reasons. First, as
discussed, there is no mechanism to double-entrench any
“constitution” such that Facebook could not amend it at-will,
making it difficult to place too much faith in its power. Second, the
constitution itself will not have sociological legitimacy and so users
Kurt Wagner, Facebook is Taking Down 22 More Pages Tied to Infowars
Founder Alex Jones, RECODE (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.recode.net/2019/2/5/
18212439/facebook-alex-jones-remove-pages-infowars-again
[https://perma.cc/393M-XXSQ].
223
Laurence Dodds, Facebook and Instagram Crack Down on Anorexia Posts
in Effort to Combat Eating Disorders, TELEGRAPH (July 13, 2019),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/07/13/facebook-instagram-bananorexia-posts-effort-combat-eating-disorders/ [https://perma.cc/W53T-SRMV].
224
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
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have no special reason to accept decisions made ostensibly in
accordance with it. A list of human rights buzzwords released by
Facebook or chosen by Zuckerberg will not have the same resonance
as national constitutions that are typically adopted through
democratic processes. Although Zuckerberg seems to have been
reading some Rawls, 225 he is more founder than founding father and
has little mandate to decide the values of the entire community of
Facebook users. A choice by him to prioritize “voice” over
“dignity,” for example, might resonate with some users but cannot
be said to be reflective of the will of those users in any real sense
nor will those that disagree have much reason to feel themselves
reasonably beholden to Zuckerberg’s choice.
Facebook could, and many have argued should, 226 adopt other
widely endorsed norms such as international human rights law as
the basis of its decisions. Facebook itself has said it looks to
documents like the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights for guidance on where to draw the lines on freedom of
expression. 227 There are some potential limitations with adopting
these norms wholesale, 228 but they could provide a starting point on
which to develop a more mature form of content moderation.
International human rights law has the advantage of having a
significant reservoir of legitimacy in certain communities which
Facebook and the FOB could draw down on. Many scholars are
doing important work on this topic, but it is not explored any further
225
John Constine, Highlights & Transcript from Zuckerberg’s 20K-word Ethics
Talk, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 20, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/20/
zuckerberg-harvard-zittrain/ [https://perma.cc/YJ94-NKZH].
226
Kaye, supra note 14; Evelyn Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression
Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26 (2018); ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 7; see
discussion of this proposal in Evelyn Douek, U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Latest
Report on Online Content Regulation Calls for “Human Rights by Default,”
LAWFARE (June 6, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-special-rapporteurslatest-report-online-content-regulation-calls-human-rights-default
[https://perma.cc/3YXC-JF4Y].
227
Richard Allan, Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Free
Expression?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 9, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/ [https://perma.cc/DGR9-UEMY].
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here for the simple reason that at this stage Facebook is showing no
indication that it intends for international human rights law to be the
fundamental basis for its content moderation.
Therefore, a fundamental set of values is a necessary but not
sufficient part of creating legitimacy for Facebook’s content
moderation and the FOB’s decisions. Affirmatively stating what the
purpose of content moderation on Facebook is can guide the FOB’s
interpretative process, but it cannot of itself compel those who had
no say in deciding those values to view them as legitimate.
V.
MAXIMIZING THE FOB’S POTENTIAL
The FOB can still bring significant benefits to Facebook’s
content moderation despite these limits on the legitimacy it can
create. Maximizing these benefits requires acknowledging these
limitations and designing around them. This includes accepting two
facts inherent in the problem of content moderation on private
platforms: Facebook will always retain the power to overrule the
FOB’s decisions, and in many of the most difficult cases there will
be no “right” answer. Institutional design that accounts for these
facts will be stronger in the long run. It should focus on the two key
benefits that the FOB can bring. First, a practical benefit: a judicialstyle check, even if reversable by Facebook, can improve
Facebook’s policy formation processes. Second, a sociological
benefit: bringing greater public acceptance of Facebook’s rules
through the performance of public reasoning. 229
A. Weakness as Strength
The FOB can improve Facebook’s policies without being the
ultimate authority on every aspect of the platform’s rules. The idea
that the FOB’s review of Facebook’s decisions should be final and
irreversible, not only in the particular case but in all similar cases
going forward, is a fundamentally American perspective. Indeed,
this is known as strong-form judicial review, and the Supreme Court
of the United States is considered the “archetype or paradigm” of

229
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this practice. 230 Tushnet, the leading writer on the strong-form/weakform distinction, describes the strong-form model in the following
way: “[i]n systems with strong-form judicial review, of which the
United States is usually taken to be representative, the constitutional
court has the power to invalidate primary legislation, and legislative
responses to such invalidations are made quite difficult.” 231
By contrast, the central characteristic of weak-form review is
that “courts assess legislation against constitutional norms, but do
not have the final word on whether statutes comply with those
norms” and judicial interpretation can be displaced by ordinary
legislative processes. 232 Commentators have suggested that this kind
of override would undermine the FOB’s independence. Kadri has
argued that “[i]f Facebook is free to unilaterally overrule appellate
decisions it doesn’t like, the talk of a new era of radical transparency
and accountability will be overblown. . . . [A]mending its legal code
willy-nilly would undermine the entire project.” 233 But the
comparative literature on “weak-form” or “dialogic” review
suggests this may be too simplistic. There are many benefits of a
weak-form model of review that may make it more appropriate for
the dynamic and complex environment that is Facebook.
1.

The Benefits of a Judicial-Style Check on Policy-Making
Weak-form review is well-suited to counter blockages in the
“legislative process” (here, the formulation of Community
Standards). 234 Dixon describes two forms of blockages: blind spots
and inertia. Both are present in Facebook’s policy formation.
Blind spots arise because initial policies are often written in
time-pressured conditions, and cannot fully anticipate all the
Aileen Kavanagh, What’s so Weak about “Weak-Form Review”? The Case
of the UK Human Rights Act 1998, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1008, 1011 (2015).
231
Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World Review
Article, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 89, 89 (2003).
232
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ix (2008).
233
Thomas Kadri, How Supreme a Court?, SLATE MAGAZINE (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-independent-speechcontent-appeals-court.html [https://perma.cc/AA9X-X3RR].
234
Dixon, supra note 27.
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possible circumstances in which a policy will need to be applied. 235
This well describes the process for the formulation of Community
Standards at Facebook. Initial rules were written haphazardly as
international expansion meant the platform needed to accommodate
a rapidly growing and changing user base, and revisions have often
been prompted by particular high-profile controversies. 236 As
Klonick has observed, “internal policies and the rules that reflect
them are constantly being updated . . . because Facebook is
attempting, in large part, to rapidly reflect the norms and
expectations of its users.” 237 A recent Oxford-Stanford report
highlighted that “Facebook’s policy changes and priorities are often
highly reactive to outrage and scandal in the relatively narrow
spectrum of Western media and politics.” 238 This description of the
reactive nature of Facebook’s policy-making parallels the
description given by Calabresi of the typical legislative process, who
notes that blind spots can arise because “[l]egislatures often act
hastily or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because
of panic or crises or because, more often, they are simply pressed
for time.” 239 Judicial-style checks help overcome blind spots,
because they consider the application of rules retrospectively and in
the context of particular cases. 240 The FOB can take into account
perspectives that initial policy-makers did not have available to
them or provide an opportunity to review unintended consequences
of a rule’s operation in practice.
Id. at 2208–09.
Klonick, supra note 40, at 1630–35, 1648–58 (discussing updates to policies
as a result of public outcry regarding Facebook’s treatment of posts depicting
breastfeeding, a gay kiss, nude art, beheading videos and a number of other
examples.); GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 67 (“Revisions of the guidelines often
come only in response to outcries and public controversies.” Gillespie discusses
the example of pro-ana and self-harm guidelines updated in response to a media
expose.).
237
Klonick, supra note 40, at 1649.
238
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 9.
239
Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80,
103–4 (1991).
240
Dixon, supra note 27, at 2214; Richard H. Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy
Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1697 (2008).
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Inertia arises where policy-makers do not have the time to
devote to changing rules that are already in effect or because the
status quo will often prevail in hard cases when there are
disagreements about what should be done. 241 This can be seen in the
history of content moderation on Facebook too. For example, the
status quo of leaving up Alex Jones’ posts prevailed until the
company was forced to reconsider because other platforms decided
to remove him. 242 The FOB can create a more formalized process for
prompting Facebook to address blockages. The process of review
can disrupt the status quo, draw public and Facebook’s attention to
blind spots or inertia, and provide an opportunity for Facebook to
correct any error. 243
This form of check also capitalizes on various actors’
specializations. 244 FOB members will have expertise in “content,
privacy, free expression, human rights, journalism, civil rights,
safety and other relevant disciplines.” 245 But Facebook staff will
have better understanding of the overall dynamics of speech on
Facebook and the surrounding platform architecture. A FOB
empowered with a weak-form judicial review mandate can create an
ecosystem that puts these two kinds of expertise in “dialogue.”
The FOB does not need to have ultimate authority over
Facebook’s rules to bring these benefits. First, even without such
authority, Facebook overruling the FOB is likely to be rare. In
practice, there would be high reputational costs for Facebook in
disregarding a decision of the FOB. Because Facebook has been
publicizing the FOB and extolling its benefits, there would likely be
significant attention given to any substantial undermining of its
authority, so Facebook is unlikely to take the decision lightly. If
done often, it would give rise to the impression that the FOB is mere
window-dressing and deprive it of all legitimacy. Furthermore, it is
Dixon, supra note 27, at 2209–12.
Kevin Roose, Facebook Banned Infowars. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/technology/facebook-bannedinfowars-now-what.html [https://perma.cc/4VZR-E2PY].
243
Dixon, supra note 27, at 2216–19.
244
Mark Tushnet, The Rise of Weak-Form Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 325 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
245
DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 1.
241
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important to remember that a key benefit of the FOB from
Facebook’s perspective is not the substantive rulings the FOB issues
but the ability this gives Facebook to distance itself from
controversial decisions. This incentive remains even where
Facebook could overturn any decisions. The similar desire to blame
courts for unpopular decisions means that in systems with weakform review (such as the U.K.) political actors often use rhetoric that
suggests they consider themselves bound by court decisions in order
to pass the political buck. 246 Therefore the practical strength of
weak-form review is often much stronger than it appears in theory.
As Feldman wrote in his original argument for a FOB, “As a
corporation, [Facebook] has the right and capacity to change its
policy at any time or even ignore it. The public understands this, as
it should. . . . [But] [i]f Facebook were to violate its commitment, it
would be subject to public censure and criticism.” 247
Additionally, in cases where Facebook does decide to overrule
the FOB, it is likely to issue an explanation given the public attention
that would surround the move. This reason-giving is also valuable,
and not only as an improvement over the current (lack of)
transparency that attends many changes in Facebook’s policies.
Explaining why Facebook took a different path to the one
recommended by the FOB could improve the quality of debate
around Facebook’s rules more generally. Currently, contentious
content decisions are made in ways that do not facilitate productive
discussion, such as executives deciding matters in the early hours of
the morning based on media reports of what other tech companies
are doing. 248 Introducing a judicial-style body into a system can
elevate the mode of decision-making and discourse, “engender[ing]
new modes of legislative discourse and practice.” 249 Mattias Kumm
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248
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249
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246
247

58

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 1

calls this “Socratic Constestation.” 250 By putting decision-makers in
dialogue with a judicial-style check, they begin to think about how
their decisions can be justified in terms that are more publicly
acceptable.
2.

The Advantages of Weak-Form Review
The last section addressed the reasons why weak-form review
will in most cases be sufficient to bring about the benefits of an
oversight body. But there are also reasons why this model might in
fact be preferable to strong-form review. This section addresses five
reasons: two theoretical, and three pragmatic. Although less august,
the pragmatic considerations may ultimately be more important.
First, weak-form review is more appropriate in cases that
involve competing rights claims. Some proponents for judicial
review acknowledge that strong-form review might be less
appropriate when the judicial body will frequently have to decide
zero-sum controversies involving the collision of two fundamental
rights. 251 This is because such cases involve difficult trade-offs that
are better left to a branch of government that is more democratically
accountable or responsive. The speech disputes that the FOB will be
charged with deciding, such as whether hate speech or sexually
explicit materials should be taken down, are “common and readily
expressible as ‘zero sum’ situations.” 252 These are archetypal clashes
between liberty rights (to speak) and dignity or equality rights (for
example, to be free from harassment). While Facebook itself is not
democratically accountable like a legislature, it may still be more
responsive to public pressure than a purposefully insulated FOB.
Importantly, Facebook is also able to take proactive action in
response to such pressure in the event that rules or FOB rulings
become out of step with community values, rather than the FOB

250
Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to
Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 L. & ETHICS
OF HUM. RTS. 141 (2010).
251
Fallon, supra note 240, at 1731; Mark Tushnet, How Different Are
Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases For and Against Judicial Review?, 30
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 55 (2010).
252
Tushnet, supra note 251, at 55.
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which will only make rulings in response to cases brought to it and
not on its own initiative.
Second, because these cases involve such difficult trade-offs,
where ultimately one person’s right or interest must give way to
another’s, it is important to keep in mind the fragile legitimacy of
the FOB itself. In such cases, the lack of a reservoir of goodwill on
which to draw on to bolster decisions that are controversial and will
upset large segments of the user base will be particularly noticeable.
This is especially so given, as discussed above, the FOB’s inability
to be truly or comprehensively representative. 253 This means that it
will necessarily be making decisions to trade-off the rights or
interests of people who will not feel they are represented in the
decision-making process. While this can be somewhat mitigated by
creating processes through which these communities are given a
voice in proceedings, it will never be wholly resolvable. As such, it
is better to be humble and not overstate the capacity of the FOB to
be the final arbiter of norms for all of Facebook’s diverse
community and allow for feedback and development.
Third, and this is the critical pragmatic point, if the FOB’s
decisions are not seen as final and irrevocable, this may make
Facebook more willing to give the FOB the broader jurisdiction that,
as argued above, is necessary for it to have meaningful oversight of
Facebook’s content moderation as a whole. A narrowly confined
and manipulatable jurisdiction will significantly impair the FOB’s
value. This is perhaps the single biggest threat to the FOB’s
legitimacy because it creates the impression that Facebook is only
willing to renounce power in areas that do not “really matter” to it.
However, it is also understandable that Facebook may not want to
completely renounce power over this central aspect of its platform.
Facebook’s content moderation is in many ways its distinctive value
offering. 254 Facebook’s right to determine the content that appears
on its platform may also be expressed in terms of the “free speech”
rights of platforms themselves. 255 Weak-form review may be a
See Part III(A).
GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 13.
255
See Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial
Analogy, in KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE EMERGING THREATS SERIES 8
(2018).
253
254
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concession to this consideration, but also to encourage the benefits
of dialogue between Facebook, the FOB, and stakeholders over a
broader range of areas. This includes the FOB’s ability to influence
policy and not just rule on specific take-downs. This kind of abstract
review jurisdiction is common in countries with specialized
constitutional courts. 256 This is because these courts were created,
“explicitly and as a constitutional priority, to protect rights” and
limiting the avenues to access judicial review would produce gaps
in rights protection. 257 And even in the U.S. there is a partial
exception to the concrete case or controversy requirement for First
Amendment challenges brought against laws for being vague or
overbroad, given the potential chilling effect of such legislation. 258
This is a recognition of not making the ability to bring challenges to
speech rules too narrow or difficult. Therefore, a generally broad
jurisdiction, including the ability to bring abstract review cases, is
critical. Facebook is more likely to create this jurisdiction and make
use of it more often if it retains the option to overrule decisions, this
is a reasonable compromise. As Stone Sweet says of the
constitutional courts of Europe that are more politicized but also
more actively engaged in the protection of rights, “[t]he erosion of
traditional separation of powers notions is the tax we pay for these
benefits [of greater rights protection].” 259
Fourth, a concession to realism: should the FOB make a ruling
that is fundamentally damaging to Facebook or out-of-step with user
values, Facebook is likely to step in and overrule it. Indeed, it may
even have a duty to its shareholders to do so. 260 It is better to accept
this reality from the outset, instead of creating a system that will
only be undermined. 261 This pragmatism will create a more robust
and durable institution in the long run.
See Jenny S. Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
548, 572 (Michel Rosenfeld & András
Sajó eds., 2012).
257
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258
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259
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260
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Finally, weak-form review is more suitable to the nature of the
online speech ecosystem. Facebook is one part of a rapidly
expanding and dynamic global information environment, where
norms of communication are changing on screens before our eyes
and global society is still reckoning with the consequences of the
hyperconnected information glut of the modern era. Weak-form
review better facilitates the capacity to evolve and revise. Indeed, it
seems the only realistic course. Entrenching decisions or making it
too costly to take into account ongoing changes would cause FOB
decisions to endure past their relevance. As Kadri acknowledges,
“it’s true that Facebook has good reason to want some flexibility to
alter its speech policies, as it constantly learns and adapts to tackle
the Sisyphean task of satisfying a ‘community’ of more than 2
billion people. Binding itself to a 2018 version of its rules will surely
be untenable.” 262 This is a fundamental point that needs to inform
the entire thinking around institutions responsible with developing
norms for online speech. There is still so much unknown about the
new online speech environment, and further research to be done.
Despite their dominance, these platforms are still a relatively young
phenomenon. Platform rules should be able to be informed by new
revelations. Facebook’s recent “shift” to privacy, 263 for example,
shows how both platforms and users can rethink their fundamental
priorities and values as the ramifications of the new online speech
ecosystem become apparent. Governance structures need to be able
to facilitate and respond to these developments.
Of course, the FOB can and should itself revise its decisions by
distinguishing or updating precedent on the basis of changed
circumstances, new evidence, or developing norms. But this is an
inadequate solution because the FOB cannot update decisions
proactively—a review body is necessarily responsive to claims and
disputes brought to it. One example is the updates Facebook made
to its approach to violent extremism in light of the Christchurch
shooting. Facebook’s policies were being updated by the day in light
Kadri, supra note 233.
Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking,
FACEBOOK (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/aprivacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/
[https://perma.cc/2W2L-L9GG].
262
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of its experience trying to stop the spread of a live video of the
attack. 264 It is now experimenting with audio-based technology to
identify designated videos, as well as sharing URLs with other
members of industry. 265 Facebook has also revised its response to
“white nationalism” and “white separatism” as part of its
acknowledgment that it needs “to get better and faster at finding and
removing hate from [its] platforms.” 266 Facebook will begin
removing such content, and also start directing people who post it to
a nonprofit dedicated to helping people leave hate groups. 267 Before
these changes, Facebook did not prohibit this kind of content on the
grounds that concepts of nationalism and separatism are “an
important part of people’s identity.” 268 These are difficult issues, and
some people may argue that Facebook made the wrong call and such
speech should not be censored. 269 But the Christchurch shooting
made clear the large number of people interested in spreading this
kind of content, and in a way that circumvents normal platform
rules. 270 As the President of Microsoft acknowledged, “it’s clear that
we need to learn from and take new action based on what happened
in Christchurch.” 271 Events such as these can help inform longstanding debates about the merits of censorship versus counterGuy Rosen, A Further Update on New Zealand Terrorist Attack, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Mar. 20, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/
technical-update-on-new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/H8PN-62DB].
265
Id.
266
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https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/standing-against-hate/ [https://perma.cc/
5PS4-ENHK].
267
Id.
268
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269
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speech, which need to evolve to take account of the new empirical
realities of how speech works online. 272
FOB decisions should not stand in the way of such evolutions.
It is easy to imagine a situation where the FOB had issued a ruling
in different circumstances that would constrain Facebook’s response
to the Christchurch shooting: for example, a holding that sharing a
URL could never be “hate speech” under the Community Standards,
or that the value of “voice” prevented Facebook from censoring
URL sharing. Or there may be cases where the FOB issues a
decision based on an understanding of how content such as hate
speech works in the offline world, which is subsequently shown to
not hold in the online ecosystem. As Scanlon urges, because rights
contain “a significant empirical component, our understanding of a
right can always be upset by evidence that forces a change in these
empirical beliefs.” 273 Again, such FOB decisions do not become
worthless when Facebook seeks to reverse them—they will force a
public dialogue about why Facebook is changing its rules or
priorities.
There are many other examples of assumptions or norms that
have been displaced or proven false as more is learned about speech
online. Researchers have been updating their findings on whether
there is a so-called “backfire effect” to labelling something as
untrue. 274 This has important ramifications for the best way to treat
misinformation, an issue which platforms have been grappling with
since the “fake news” scandals of 2016. Early findings about
whether platforms increase “echo chambers” is also being
disputed. 275 Facebook can, and should, do much more to facilitate
Research is being done to better understand these dynamics. Susan Benesch,
Launching Today: New Collaborative Study to Diminish Abuse on Twitter,
MEDIUM (Apr. 712, 2018), https://medium.com/@susanbenesch/launchingtoday-new-collaborative-study-to-diminish-abuse-on-twitter-2b91837668cc
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this kind of research by being more open with its data. 276 But the
company should not then be handicapped in its capacity to act on
new findings.
It is the strong-form nature of review in the U.S. that has lead
scholars such as Tim Wu to argue that First Amendment
jurisprudence has been made irrelevant by the changes technology
has wrought to the speech environment. 277 Changing First
Amendment jurisprudence is a heavy lift, precisely because of the
difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution or overturning Supreme
Court decisions. Given how much is still unknown about online
speech, and how this impacts offline lives, humility about the
finality of the FOB’s decisions is warranted.
3.

A Check on Users Too
The protection of minorities, however, is one area in which the
ossification of rights could actually be a significant benefit. Courts
are generally an important mechanism for the protection of minority
rights. This is one of the key reasons why courts are insulated from
ordinary political processes, so that they are not constrained from
playing this counter-majoritarian role in necessary cases. Indeed,
Dworkin argued that the essence of constitutionalism is “the theory
that the majority must be restrained to protect individual rights.” 278
Such issues often arise in the context of content moderation, where
many of the biggest content moderation controversies have been
avoiding-the-echo-chamber-about-echo-chambers-6e1f1a1a0f39
[https://perma.cc/Q9YG-BHR2].
276
LAZER ET AL., supra note 185.
277
TIM WU, IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? (2017).
278
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 175 (1977). See also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Hamilton) (“This independence of the judges is equally
requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects
of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate
reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations
in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.”); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943) (Jackson. J., writing that one’s “‘right to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights’ may not be submitted to vote.”).
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about concerns for the rights of minorities. 279 As the UN Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression has noted, “[t]he vagueness
of hate speech and harassment policies has triggered complaints of
inconsistent policy enforcement that penalizes minorities while
reinforcing the status of dominant or powerful groups.” 280 The FOB
could have an especially important role in protecting the speech of
those who are otherwise likely to be drowned out on the platform or
who are underrepresented in the communities of engineers and
content moderators who control speech on Facebook.
Zuckerberg writes in his Blueprint that “[j]ust as our board of
directors is accountable to our shareholders, [the FOB] would be
focused only on our community.” 281 He is right to distinguish
between focus on the user community and accountability to it. While
it is important that the FOB works to further the welfare of users (as
distinguished from the welfare of Facebook as a company), this is
not the same thing as making decisions that simply reflect user
preferences. Indeed, “[a]n independent judiciary does not take a poll
before rendering its decisions.” 282 But there is the possibility that the
FOB’s protective role is undermined through weak-form review if
Facebook simply has the capacity to overrule FOB decisions that are
unpopular with majorities. However, this risk does not outweigh the
potential benefit of weak-form review, and the need for content
moderation rules to be able to be dynamically updated. It is true that
there is little to guard against Facebook overruling the FOB in the
name of majoritarianism beyond Facebook’s good faith
implementation of the FOB’s independent oversight and a
commitment to “rule of law” style principles such that it will not
overturn decisions simply on the basis that they are unpopular. But,
as argued above, the very fact that content moderation decisions are
See, e.g., Schechter, supra note 142 (reporting on a letter from civil rights
organizations, including the ACLU, criticizing Facebook: “[a]ctivists in the
Movement for Black Lives have routinely reported the takedown of images
discussing racism and during protests, with the justification that it violates
Facebook’s Community Standards. At the same time, harassment and threats
directed at activists based on their race, religion, and sexual orientation is thriving
on Facebook.”); Angwin & Grassegger, supra note 51.
280
Kaye, supra note 14, at 10.
281
Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
282
Cross, supra note 135, at 559.
279
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controversial and will tend to upset significant portions of users is
part of the reason Facebook is setting the FOB up. This desire to
outsource controversy suggests that mere unpopularity of a decision
would not be a reason for Facebook to intervene because then it
would be undermining its own project to distance itself from the
controversies. In this sense, the lack of democratic accountability or
elections of Facebook’s management could provide further
protection from simple majoritarianism.
B. Public Reasoning
Public reason-giving is the defining characteristic of the FOB.
Facebook already has internal teams that continually review content
moderation standards and consult outside experts. 283 The utility of
the FOB is not merely in having experts review Facebook’s
decisions and coming to a “right” outcome. If it were, the internal
processes would be sufficient. Instead, the FOB is intended to serve
a function separate and additional to having experts weigh in on
Facebook’s rules. The core value offering of the FOB is the issuing
of public explanations for rulings. 284 As Noah Feldman wrote in his
original white paper proposing the FOB:
The advantage enjoyed by real-life constitutional courts is that they
openly address difficult cases, and so derive credit and legitimacy from
being principled. They make mistakes, and correct them. Their rules
evolve with changing technology and ideas. And instead of blaming
them for this, we mostly validate their efforts. . . . Right now, the
platforms are already doing plenty of balancing work. But they aren’t
doing it transparently or in a legal-logical way. Changes are greeted with
outrage rather than respectful engagement. All that could change if the
Facts About Content Review on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 28,
2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/content-review-facts/
[https://perma.cc/UM2P-JUHE] (Facebook noting it holds “a global forum held
every two weeks where we discuss potential changes to our policies. It includes
experts from around the world with deep knowledge of relevant laws, online
safety, counter-terrorism, operations, public policy, communications, product,
and diversity.”).
284
Casey Newton, Facebook Will Create an Independent Oversight Group to
Review Content Moderation Appeals, VERGE (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/15/18097219/facebook-independentoversight-supreme-court-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/P4QJ-96QT]. See
also DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 5.
283
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platforms provided a forum for argument, openly considered opposing
views, and announced the reasoning behind their decisions on a case-bycase basis. 285

1.

The Purpose of Public Reasons
What exactly, then, is the purpose of public reasoning? An
obvious answer might be that in an individual case adequate reasons
are an incident of due process and fairness, by allowing a user to
know the reasons for a decision (especially an adverse one)
involving their freedom of expression on the platform. 286 This is why
many common law jurisdictions have a judicial duty to give reasons
as an incident of due process 287 and all constitutional courts of
Europe are obliged to give reasons for their decisions. 288 This is also
why the Santa Clara Principles, a set of minimum requirements for
transparency and accountability for content moderation proposed by
a group of leading civil society organizations, academics, and
experts, requires that users be given “a statement of reasoning
sufficient to allow the user to understand the decision.” 289 But, as has
been noted repeatedly throughout this article, the due process
offerings of the FOB will be limited due to the small fraction of
cases it will adjudicate. Furthermore, affected users could be given
reasons without them being made public, which would also diminish
privacy concerns in releasing public opinions. Therefore, there must
be other, more general, rationales for public reason-giving.
As a practical matter, giving reasons assists in creating a
consistent body of case law by allowing the FOB and users to
understand the basis on which a particular decision is made and
distinguish or apply it in future cases. Stone Sweet describes giving
Harris, supra note 138, at 138.
See, e.g., Court of Appeal in Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000]
1 WLR 377, 381 (“The duty is a function of due process, and therefore of justice.
. . . [F]airness surely requires that the parties especially the losing party should be
left in no doubt why they have won or lost. . . . [A] requirement to give reasons
concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, the resulting decision is much more likely
to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not.”).
287
H.L. Ho, The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons, 20 LEGAL STUD. 42 (2000).
288
STONE SWEET, supra note 8, at 56 n.15.
289
The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content
Moderation, https://santaclaraprinciples.org [https://perma.cc/NG9H-KX4Q]
(last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
285
286
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defensible reasons that are accepted as a precedential interpretation
of constitutional meaning as “necessary conditions for the
emergence of effective review systems.” 290 But, reasons do not need
to be available to the public-at-large for moderators to apply them.
So, the goal of reason-giving is still more general than that.
Fundamentally, the FOB is a response to calls for decisional
transparency and a “global dialogue” with users and stakeholders
about the impacts and justifications of Facebook’s rules. 291
Platforms generally have been increasingly criticized as having
opaque decision-making that interferes with their obligations of
clarity, specificity, and predictability. 292 Public reasoning, then, is
about facilitating this dialogue and legitimizing Facebook’s exercise
of power over its users. As Rawls argued, in a pluralistic society
where there will always be disagreement about what rule is best, the
exercise of power over those who disagree with decisions is only
legitimized through public reasoning that proceeds in a way people
might be expected to respect. 293 Fallon notes that when decisionmakers rely on reasons that reasonable people would acknowledge
as fair (and not, for example, idiosyncratic or partisan), this creates
legitimacy even if people might reach different ultimate
judgments. 294 Therefore, the goal is emphatically not to create
collective agreement, but to allow for reasoned disagreement. Tom
Tyler’s research has shown that people’s judgments of legitimacy
do not depend primarily on their obtaining favorable outcomes, but
are more strongly influenced by the processes and procedures
authorities use, including whether they afford participation,
demonstrate impartiality, and show respect for people’s interests as
worthy of consideration. 295 Therefore, public reasoning is crucial to
the FOB’s central goal of creating legitimacy for Facebook’s rules.
Stone Sweet, supra note 90, at 825.
ASH ET AL., supra note 16, at 13; Kaye, supra note 14.
292
Kaye, supra note 14.
293
RAWLS, supra note 28, at 217; see also FALLON, supra note 76, at 12;
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 230 (2004).
294
FALLON, supra note 76, at 128.
295
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 283 (2003); Facebook Data Transparency Advisory
Group, supra note 88, at 34.
290
291
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Until now, Facebook has exercised substantial power over not
only individual speech, but entire societies’ public discourse, while
giving little justification for the way in which it does so. The FOB
is a step towards changing this. Just as constitutional courts can
provide “a focal point for a new rhetoric of state legitimacy” during
democratic transitions, 296 so too might the FOB provide a forum for
working through the principles in this new era of online governance.
Two opposing examples are illustrative of the benefits of public
reasoning. In the first example, a lack of public reasoning
delegitimized a decision even for those that agreed with it. In the
second, reasoning helped the affected user come to accept a decision
they still thought was wrong.
The first example is the controversy over Alex Jones’ presence
on Facebook. Leaked emails show the difficulty internal executives
were having deciding whether a particular post violated Facebook’s
Community Standards. 297 In one email, an executive referred to the
fact that the number of comments on the post that violated the
Community Standards “did not meet the threshold for deletion.” 298
UK executives then pointed out local context, noting that the image
is famous in the UK and “widely acknowledged to be anti-Semitic”
there, justifying deletion. 299 These are the kinds of arguments the
FOB could help ventilate. The “threshold” referred to is not defined
in any public document. Whether or not this is a legitimate way of
determining whether content should be removed, the fact that it is
applied in a non-transparent way by executives that seem to disagree
about whether the standard is met deprives it of legitimacy as a rule
that users can reasonably agree to be bound by. The FOB might
ultimately decide to apply the same standard—again, the benefits of
the FOB are not necessarily to reach different or “better” outcomes.
But if the FOB did decide to apply this test, it would need to explain
Stone Sweet, supra note 90, at 827.
Jake Kanter, Leaked emails reveal Facebook’s intense internal discussion
over Alex Jones’ “anti-Semitic” post on Instagram, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 28,
2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-emails-reveal-discussionabout-alex-jones-instagram-account-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/H3FR-EFV9].
298
Id. Infringing comments amounted to about 4% of the total number of
comments on the post.
299
Id.
296
297
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this decision publicly which would allow for greater consistency in
its application as well as contestation about the appropriateness of
the threshold in the first place. Similarly, public reasoning can
excavate local context to inform users unfamiliar with it why a post
has special meaning in different circumstances. But the importance
of public reasoning is most evident in the reaction to the ultimate
decision to take down Jones’ pages altogether. Although many
commentators had been calling for his removal for some time, the
response was mixed. Few defended Jones, but there was frustration
with the way Facebook executed the ban and the lack of
transparency around the reason or timing. 300 Without public
reasoning, even those that agreed with the decision thought it was
illegitimate.
The second example is from a different platform but illustrates
the benefits of giving understandable rationales. David Neiwert’s
Twitter account was suspended when he changed his profile picture
to the cover of his book about the alt-right, which included KKK
April Glaser, Why Facebook’s Latest Ban of Alex Jones and Company Was
So Underwhelming, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2019/
05/facebook-alex-jones-ban-underwhelming.html
[https://perma.cc/S5HU5A2U] (“Facebook has the power to punish wrongdoers, as it did on Thursday.
But we don’t know its full rationale for doing so, nor do we know who will be
next.”); Bret Stephens, Facebook’s Unintended Consequence, N.Y. TIMES (May
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/opinion/facebook-freespeech.html [https://perma.cc/PY7M-DFGM] (“The deeper problem is the
overwhelming concentration of technical, financial and moral power in the hands
of people who lack the training, experience, wisdom, trustworthiness, humility
and incentives to exercise that power responsibly. . . . the decision to absolutely
ban certain individuals will always be a human one. It will inevitably be
subjective.”); David French, Why Facebook’s Bans Warrant Concern, NAT'L
REV. (May 3, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/why-facebooksbans-warrant-concern/ [https://perma.cc/XX9Q-V92E] (“This means a person
can potentially face social-media bans even if they comply with every syllable of
the company’s speech rules on the company’s platform. The potential for abuse
is obvious, as is the potential chilling effect”); Emily Stewart, Facebook bans Alex
Jones, Infowars, Louis Farrakhan, and others it deems “dangerous,” VOX (May
2, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/2/18527357/facebook-bans-alexjones-louis-farrakhan-infowars [https://perma.cc/WUX9-KSA8] (“It’s not clear
why Facebook is doing this now, but pressure for it to take action has been
mounting for quite some time, and the decision is probably at least in part an effort
to get some positive PR.”).
300
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hoods. 301 Neiwert thought the suspension was wrong and refused to
change the picture. From his perspective, the image was about
analyzing hate, not promoting it. Representatives from Twitter
reached out and explained that although they appreciated the
distinction he was making, the company takes a no-tolerance stance
on such images in profile pictures because they are more
prominently displayed on the site. Neiwert wrote that the
conversation “was cooperative and [they were] genuinely interested
in my input. These Twitter officials were able to persuade me, at
least, that they very much share my concerns.” 302 Neiwert still
disagreed with the decision, but once he understood the reasoning
he agreed to change his profile picture and his account was
reinstated.
These examples illustrate the ultimate hope for the FOB. As
Feldman summarizes:
Some controversy and disagreement over the [FOB’s] decisions is
inevitable. But even when it occurs, it will come in the context of the
public understanding that Facebook is publicly and responsibly
grappling with balancing values in cases that have no simple right
answers. This repeated engagement should produce legitimacy for the
decision process, and a new narrative for Facebook’s engagement with
these problems. 303

Another benefit of public reasoning is its ability to help in normsetting. The FOB can provide contestation and explanation of norms
in a more public forum. This in turn might make more community
members aware of the rules which helps generate compliance.
Grimmelman describes the importance of this aspect of moderation,
saying that moderation’s “most important mission is to create strong
shared norms among participants. . . . Moderators can influence
norms directly by articulating them. They can do this either in
general, with codes of conduct and other broad statements of rules,
or in specific cases by praising good behavior and criticizing bad.” 304
301
David Neiwert, Why I Ended My Fight With Twitter—For Now, DAILY KOS
(June 25, 2019), https://www.dailykos.com/story/2019/6/25/1867213/-Why-Iended-my-fight-with-Twitter-for-now [https://perma.cc/4YTW-3R8R].
302
Id.
303
Harris, supra note 138, at 145.
304
James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42,
61–2 (2015).
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Matias similarly found that the visibility of the rules of online
communities substantially increases compliance and overall
participation in the community. 305 By allowing greater visibility and
participation in content moderation decisions through public
reasoning, the FOB can embed the process of rule formation in a
broader community and help norms be formed and tested.
Public reasoning is also an important constraint on the FOB
itself. Although it should be independent, this does not mean the
FOB should be unconstrained. Giving principled reasons is the
primary way that judges can be held accountable for their exercise
of power. 306 As Mark Tushnet writes, “the desideratum is not
judicial independence alone but rather judicial independence
coupled with accountability to law.” 307 He explains that “without the
latter, independent judges can act arbitrarily and so
anticonstitutionally.” 308 The FOB will need to develop a form of
discourse, centered around norms, that distinguishes it from a mere
political institution.309 It is the norms and constraints of principled
reason-giving that will reassure users that they are not merely
“exchanging one set of tyrants for another.” 310 This legitimacycreating constraint is especially important when ambiguity is
common. Accountability to law does not mean demonstration that
the law requires a particular result. Indeed, as Rawls says, “public
reason often allows more than one reasonable answer to any
particular question.” 311 What is important is not convincing people
that the reasoning methods employed offer determinate outcomes
but, as Roux has observed, that decision-makers should use
J. NATHAN MATIAS, PROCS. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENTISTS,
PREVENTING HARASSMENT AND INCREASING GROUP PARTICIPATION THROUGH
SOCIAL NORMS IN 2,190 ONLINE SCIENCE DISCUSSIONS (2019).
306
Roderick A. Macdonald & Hoi Kong, Judicial Independence as a
Constitutional Virtue, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831, 839 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
307
Tushnet, supra note 92, at 418–19. See also GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra
note 189, at 45; Cross, supra note 135, at 558.
308
Tushnet, supra note 92, at 419 n.145; see also GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI,
supra note 189, at 196.
309
GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 189, at 196.
310
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1993).
311
RAWLS, supra note 28, at 240.
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“methods that have come to be seen by the legal community and the
broader legal culture as legitimate.” 312 Public reasoning is the way
in which the FOB can show its work in this regard.
2.

The Challenge of Giving Acceptable Reasons
There are four particular aspects of the FOB’s context that will
make its use of public reasoning to create legitimacy uniquely
challenging. First, neither the FOB itself nor the community it
speaks to are socialized in a particular style of discourse, such as
legal reasoning. The FOB’s reasons and those that read them will
not draw on what Llewellyn called law’s “steadying factors” which
provides accepted doctrinal techniques for legal argument. 313
Judicial legitimacy is itself at least partially rooted in adherence to
this craft. 314 Of course, some contest the constraining power of these
norms and even their existence at all. 315 But most accept that legal
decisions are something different to mere politics. 316 So while there
is some degree of choice, most constitutional scholars for example
agree there is still something distinctively legal inherent in the
process of constitutional construction. 317 Setting aside the
fundamental debate over legal realism, it is sufficient for present
purposes to note that finding a mode of discourse that can be
accepted as legitimizing in Facebook’s vast and diverse community
will only be harder when not tied to a previously existing set of
professional norms.
This is exacerbated because, second, there are no accepted
global norms to guide the substantive issues. Discussing the
diversity of views on freedom of expression, Facebook’s Head of
Global Policy Management has written:
Theunis Roux, Reinterpreting the Mason Court Revolution: A Historical
Institutionalist Account of Judge-Driven Constitutional Transformation in
Australia, 43 FED. L. REV. 1, 24 (2015).
313
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
5, 19–23 (1960). Ginsburg notes that professional norms of fidelity to law are a
kind of internalized ideology that help reduce the agency costs of using judges as
agents to monitor administrative structures. See Ginsburg, supra note 119, at 65.
314
Fallon, supra note 205, at 1826.
315
Id. at 1826–27.
316
FALLON, supra note 76, at 2.
317
Landau & Dixon, supra note 81, at 23.
312
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Laws differ from country to country, not only in their text, but also in
how their enforcement is pursued by authorities and how they are applied
by courts. Even within the confines of one country, and even within
common law jurisdictions, courts differ in their interpretation of laws.
To complicate matters, laws evolve. New laws are passed, old laws are
amended, and courts invalidate some laws altogether. . . . [E]ven
assuming one government’s laws represent the social norms of its
people, those laws will not represent the norms of every person on a
global social media service. 318

Adopting international law standards does not simplify the
matter. These are not universally endorsed. 319 Nor are they
themselves stable—for example, “international doctrine and
practice relating to prohibition of hate speech remain uneven.” 320
Procedural elements of resolving disagreement are not so easily
divorced from the underlying substance. 321 Finding arguments that
can reasonably be regarded as acceptable across such diverse
substantive traditions will be especially challenging.
Third, compounding the difficulties, Facebook does not have an
underlying rationale for free speech on its platform to justify its
choices. As Adrienne Stone notes, even in nation states, “identifying
the value or set of values underlying any single constitutional system
of freedom of expression is likely to be difficult.” 322 For Facebook,
it is even more difficult. What is the purpose of speech on Facebook?
The simple answer that it generates revenue by capturing attention
is not one that will help satisfactorily justify outcomes in difficult
cases. But the three most common rationales from other traditions
do not fit easily in the context of Facebook: facilitating selfgovernment, the search for truth, or respect for individual autonomy.
This idea that freedom of expression is valuable because of its
capacity to promote democratic self-government is the most widely
Bickert, supra note 31, at 260–61.
See, e.g., Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in
International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017) (critiquing permissible
restrictions on freedom of expression under international law).
320
Cleveland, supra note 59, at 225.
321
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 157 (1999).
322
Adrienne Stone, The Comparative Constitutional Law of Freedom of
Expression, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406, 416 (Tom Ginsburg &
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
318
319
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adopted in modern legal systems, 323 but seems inappropriate in the
context of Facebook. Facebook is not a democracy—it is a
business. 324 It does not rely on popular will in setting its rules (a brief
experiment with a limited such system in 2009 failed due to poor
voting levels). 325 It has expressly disavowed any conception of its
platform as facilitating the search for truth. 326 In any event, its
algorithm manipulates the “marketplace of ideas” which is
metaphorically said to lead to truth’s revelation. This leaves the third
dominant justification for freedom of speech: that based on
individual autonomy. 327 Perhaps this is the most fitting
understanding of Facebook’s justification for free speech, but still
sits uneasily with the fact that Facebook regularly censors speech. It
is therefore difficult to pin down any underlying theory behind
Facebook’s content moderation system which could inform the
FOB’s work, and which could satisfy those that disagree with the
FOB’s decisions, that they are based on some more fundamental
principle. As discussed above, Facebook’s statement of values
might mitigate this, but only to a certain extent. A decision to
prioritize “safety” would give a clear guiding principle in many
individual decisions. But if Facebook decides its central value is
“voice,” this will not necessarily make trade-offs easier. Whose
Id. at 414.
Pozen, supra note 32 (explaining that there is a “tension between Facebook’s
seemingly sincere concern for free speech values and its explicit aspiration to
make users feel socially safe and ‘connected’ [and hence to maximize the time
they spend on the site], a tension that is shaped by market forces but ultimately
resolved by benevolent leader and controlling shareholder Zuckerberg.”).
325
Adi Robertson, Facebook used to be a democracy — but nobody voted,
VERGE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/5/17176834/markzuckerberg-facebook-democracy-governance-vote-failure [https://perma.cc/
F4TN-AUQM].
326
Andrew Liptak, Mark Zuckerberg warns about Facebook “becoming
arbiters of truth,” VERGE (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/
11/13/13613566/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-misinformation-hoax-media
[https://perma.cc/W8VR-QFHY]; Arjun Kharpal, Sandberg: Facebook Doesn’t
Want to Be the ‘Arbiter of the Truth,’ DAILY BEAST (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2017/04/24/facebook-not-the-arbiter-ofthe-truth [https://perma.cc/EL85-A369].
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voice should be given priority, for example? Justifying decisions to
prioritize voice without a thesis of the underlying purpose of voice
will limit the extent to which justifications can legitimize choices.
These are the challenges for the FOB fulfilling its role as an
“exemplar of public reason.” 328 Nevertheless, it is a central and
important goal for the institution. As more expression occurs in
these online spaces, it is unavoidable that there will need to be some
body that performs this role of rationalizing contested and
contestable decisions about how to regulate important public
discourse. For now, the FOB is the first attempt at such an
institution. It might be a canary in the coal mine of the future of
online governance. No doubt, much will be learned from its
successes and, perhaps inevitably, blunders.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The FOB represents an important innovation, and a welcome
attempt to disperse the enormous power over online discourse held
by Facebook. More importantly, however, it will serve to make that
power more transparent and legitimate by facilitating dialogues
around how and why Facebook’s power is exercised in the first
place. This is a more modest goal than becoming an independent
source of universally accepted free speech norms, but it is still
incredibly ambitious for an institution that is breaking new ground.
As Stone Sweet writes about constitutional courts in regime
transitions:
The ultimate measure of legitimacy for any [constitutional court] may
well be its success at helping the polity construct a new constitutional
identity’—a massive undertaking. . . . [A]s Scheppele writes, a
[constitutional court] is often ‘the primary mechanism’ for organizing
the transition away from the former ‘regime of horror’ to constitutional
democracy. Insofar as [constitutional courts] are successful, the
legitimacy of the constitution, as a basic framework for the exercise of
public authority, will become indistinguishable from the regime’s
political legitimacy. 329

For the best chances of success, Facebook and the FOB should
be humble and acknowledge the very real limitations that such a
328
329
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body will face. As a Facebook representative notes, “We are very
much at the beginning of this process—it has not been done before
. . . .”330 There is no true model to base the new body on. Deciding
what the FOB will be includes accepting what it cannot be—this
includes acknowledging that it cannot be a way to bring due process
to any but the smallest fraction of content moderation decisions. Nor
can it authoritatively resolve clashing ideas of freedom of
expression. But, if done right, the FOB may be able to bring a greater
sense of legitimacy and acceptance to Facebook’s content
moderation ecosystem. This is a massive undertaking, and will
require a healthy dose of “constitutional luck.” 331 History teaches us
that ultimately many variables for constitutional success are beyond
the ability of designers to control, and success or failure is
necessarily contingent. This may be unsatisfying. But the question
should not be whether the FOB is inevitably a perfect institution or
an ideal-type of due process and transparency that will bind
Facebook to stringent human rights standards. The question for now
is whether it is better than the alternative: the current haphazard,
opaque process that draws inspiration from Kafka more than Kelsen.
By that standard, the FOB shows real promise.
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